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This dissertation is a collection of three essays in applied microeconomics. In the first essay, I 
study the enrollment effects of Tennessee Promise, a state-funded financial aid program in the 
two-year college sector. I document a substantial response in full-time first-time enrollment and 
some degree of substitutability between the unsubsidized and subsidized college sectors 
following the inception of the Tennessee Promise program. The second essay takes initial steps 
to examine the broader implications of free college. I first use institution-level data to construct 
three metrics of diversity, namely the share of underrepresented minorities in the student body, 
Simpson’s index, and Shannon’s index. I then leverage the staggered timing of statewide “free 
college” programs across the United States to document these programs’ impacts on college 
diversity. Overall, free-college programs have not catalyzed an economically significant effect 
on the demographic composition of public two-year colleges, although initial results do offer 
grounds for optimism. This essay places the first essay in perspective. In relation to the literature, 
the findings complement recent work, which has documented the early success of promise 
programs in encouraging community college enrollment. To this end, I provide several policy 
implications to improve practice. 
 
The third essay is a joint work in which my coauthor and I seek to understand US immigrants’ 
health-related behaviors and outcomes. We simultaneously examine risky consumption choices 
(smoking and drinking) and physical health conditions (asthma, diabetes, vision problems, and 
coronary heart diseases) using data from the National Health Interview Surveys (1989-2018). We 
incorporate cohort fixed-effects and the interactions between cohort effects and years since 





time. For all health indicators, we find that there are important differences between arriving 
immigrants and natives. Despite some heterogeneity in the dynamics of unhealthy behaviors, this 
heterogeneity seems to dissipate as we explore longer-term health outcomes. Overall, our 
findings provide an interesting outlook on how the integration into the host society affects 
American immigrants’ health. We contribute new results to the immigrant assimilation literature, 
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In this paper, we study a novel, broad-based tuition assistance program within the two-year 
college sector and contribute new results to both the expansive higher education funding 
literature and the modest yet fast-growing college promise literature. Starting with the class of 
2015, the state of Tennessee has been covering full tuition and fees for any high school graduate 
who wishes to attend a state-funded two-year college under its unique Tennessee Promise 
initiative. Exploiting the timing of this policy shock, we employ quasi-experimental methods to 
document that Tennessee Promise increased full-time first-time undergraduate enrollment at the 
state’s community colleges by at least 40 percent. We also find a positive response in attendance 
among black and Hispanic students. An auxiliary analysis shows a short-run reduction of about 2 
percent in enrollment at the state’s public four-year institutions, suggesting some degree of 
substitutability between the unsubsidized and subsidized college sectors. We discuss the 
implications of our findings for the design of future statewide free-college programs.  
List of abbreviations: ATT: Average treatment effect on the treated; DID: Difference-in-
differences; FTF: Full-time first-time (freshman) undergraduate enrollment; GSC: Generalized 







It is well known that price is an important determinant of an individual’s demand for higher 
education. Due to the ever-increasing costs of acquiring a traditional bachelor’s degree, attending 
a state community college either to complete a terminal postsecondary degree or to later transfer 
to a four-year institution remains an attractive and popular route for many high school graduates 
in the United States. For most, however, community college education is not free. At present, 
most students, except those in the lowest income percentiles, are expected to incur some out-of-
pocket college expenses.1 
The escalation of tuition and fees in recent decades has encouraged Tennessee, Oregon, and 
Minnesota to initiate plans to reverse this trend and provide free community college education 
across the board. Statewide tuition assistance policies have been designed to mitigate the cost 
pressures, increase college-going rates, and, ultimately, foster future regional economic activity. 
Tennessee, in particular, instituted the “Drive to 55” campaign in 2013 under Governor Haslam 
with an ambitious mission of bringing the share of Tennesseans possessing a college degree or 
certificate up to 55 percent by 2025. One prominent piece of “Drive to 55” is the Tennessee 
Promise program, which entails the coverage of tuition and fees for high school graduates 
attending the state’s two-year colleges. Conditional on several eligibility criteria, none of which 
is related to need or merit, high school students beginning with the graduating class of 2015 can 
now attend the state’s two-year colleges at no cost via the "last-dollar" scholarship formula, 
whereby the parts of tuition fees not met by other federal and state aid programs are covered.  
 
1The College Board (2016) reports that for 2011–2012 full-time dependent students, the average total grant aid 
ranged from $1,100 to $5,690, depending on their relative positions in the income quartiles. However, this aid was 
only sufficient to pay for tuition and fees for those in the lower half of the income distribution. Detailed statistics 






In this study, we examine the enrollment impacts of Tennessee’s novel program. Following 
Cornwell et al. (2006), we shift the focus away from individual student outcomes and instead 
look at enrollment changes at the institution level. This analysis warrants attention, since 
statewide free-college programs like Tennessee Promise are large, and given that they target the 
entire population of high school students in the state as opposed to the marginal, highest-
performing, or lowest-performing students, the intended effects of these programs are expected 
to be more general than what local estimates would indicate. In addition to appealing to state 
committees, our study is of interest to both researchers and college-level policymakers.  
While our main focus is on two-year institutions, we also conduct an auxiliary analysis on 
enrollment substitutability. The motivation is that if publicly funded programs like Tennessee 
Promise provide a truly credible signal, then we might expect a change in college preferences 
among high school seniors, which in turn might alter enrollment patterns at the state’s four-year 
institutions, at least in the short run. This conjecture is at least descriptively corroborated by a 
notable fall in enrollment at branch campuses of the University of Tennessee, including the 
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga and the University of Tennessee at Martin, which was 
observed immediately following the inception of the Tennessee Promise program. 
Exploiting the timing of Tennessee’s policy action, we employ quasi-experimental designs with 
the classic difference-in-differences (DID henceforth) estimator and the new generalized 
synthetic control (GSC henceforth) estimator to quantify the treatment effects, with the latter 
approach being robust to a potential violation of the common-trends assumption. Our results 
indicate that the Tennessee Promise program has had a notable enrollment impact on the state’s 





attendance among black and Hispanic students and some degree of enrollment substitutability 
across colleges in the short run. 
Our study contributes to both academic and policy discourse in meaningful ways. Whereas 
community colleges play a significant role in the US postsecondary education system, previous 
research has largely focused on the impact of financial support on college outcomes among four-
year institutions. By investigating a recent universal tuition-free policy within the two-year 
sector, we add new results to the expansive higher education funding literature and the modest 
yet fast-growing literature on college promise programs.  
Given the ongoing discussions on the concept of “free college” at the national level, our results 
for a statewide program like Tennessee Promise are timely and policy-relevant. As of March 
2018, 16 states had at least one statewide free-college variant. Among these 16, 10 states had 
executed both enactment and funding, with eight enacting the program in 2017 alone.2It is 
predicted that Tennessee’s action will provide lessons for other states to follow in the future. To 
this end, we highlight the most important similarities and differences between Tennessee 
Promise and other aid programs, including smaller-scale, residency-based projects as well as 
HOPE-style initiatives, to shed light on the future design of statewide free-college policies.3 
 
2The Future of Statewide College Promise Programs. (2018, May 16). Retrieved from 
https://tcf.org/content/report/future-statewide-college-promise-programs/?session=1 
3HOPE stands for “Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally.” It is a popular financial aid program adopted by 
states to support their in-state students’ pursuit of postsecondary education. The funding for these scholarships 
typically comes from the net proceeds of state lotteries. Introduced in the early 1990s, HOPE programs have 
experienced substantial growth, with Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship program being one of the largest (Sjoquist and 
Winters, 2015b). In most cases, to be eligible for a HOPE scholarship, an applicant must meet certain academic 
requirements based, for example, on high school GPA or standardized test scores.On the other hand, eligibility for 
free-college (known as “promise”) programs is typically based on state residency only. With the exception of New 
York’s Excelsior Scholarship, most promise programs require no family income thresholds. Most relevant to our 
context, a concise yet useful comparison between Tennessee’s HOPE scholarship and its version of free college is 





1.2. Related literature 
1.2.1. Research on the financial aid-college outcome nexus: Toward a new conceptual 
model 
The relationship between financial aid and college outcomes has been extensively discussed in 
the previous literature. Researchers typically turn to Becker’s (1964) human capital model to 
motivate discussions related to the impacts of financial aid on the individual demand for higher 
education. The most powerful prediction of Becker’s framework is that, all else equal, an 
exogenous reduction in tuition costs will induce marginally motivated students (those who are 
weighing the decision to matriculate at a particular college) to enroll (Becker, 1964; Welch, 
2014; Castleman and Long, 2016). 
This simple economic intuition appears consistent with the bulk of empirical evidence, which has 
documented the positive impacts of aid programs on a wide range of college outcomes, including 
enrollment, access, and completion (Deming and Dynarski, 2009; Kane, 2003, 2004; Dynarski, 
2000, 2003; Castleman and Long, 2016). However, in assessing the performance of financial aid 
and merit-based policy instruments, including HOPE scholarships, researchers have also pointed 
out the ineffectiveness of certain programs in encouraging enrollment and completion, relying on 
data from Georgia (Cornwell et al., 2006; Sjoquist and Winters, 2015a) and Tennessee 
(Carruthers and Ozek, 2016), among other states.4,5 Another relevant modern perspective is 
exposed in the work of Havranek et al. (2018), who extract 443 estimates from 43 related studies 
 
 
4Importantly, Carruthers and Ozek study the consequences of losing financial support from the HOPE scholarship 
among Tennessee’s public college students. They find that failure to meet the scholarship renewal threshold causes 
mild detachment from college and increases earnings by about 14 cents per dollar of lost aid. They document no 
local impact on timely degree completion. 






on the tuition–enrollment relationship to show an estimated mean elasticity of almost zero once 
publication bias and model uncertainty are accounted for.  
Among other things, this mixed evidence might be attributable to the varying degrees to which 
different programs acknowledge the role of market imperfections, a direct violation of the 
perfect-markets notion on which Becker’s original model is based. Page and Scott-Clayton 
(2016) take a critical look at the college financial aid literature and identify two primary sources 
of market failures, namely, credit constraints and lack of good information, which lay the 
foundations for policy interventions and corrective measures.6 These factors are vital to our 
understanding of the intended effects of different aid programs on college access and enrollment 
yet are not well understood.  
Of the five common financial-aid vehicles discussed in Page and Scott-Clayton (2016), broad-
based programs provide the most promising conceptual model for modern aid interventions, 
most notably because of their simplicity compared to the more conventional approaches. An 
ideal prototype for policymaking would be one that emphasizes not only simple formulas in 
eligibility determination but also provision of good and reliable information to individual 
decision-makers. This realization then raises a natural policy question of whether and how design 
and implementation factor into the relative performance of different aid programs.  
1.2.2. Research on community college funding 
While the link between financial aid and collegiate outcomes has been extensively explored at 
both college and student levels, little attention has been paid to the community college sector 
until recently. Most of the aforementioned research focuses on four-year institutions. Using 
 
6The presence of education externalities, which cause the social benefits of college-going to exceed its private 





National Center for Education Statistics data, Welch (2014) estimates that approximately 40 
percent of college enrollees attend two-year institutions as opposed to four-year institutions. 
Given their role in the postsecondary education sector in general, and their share in total public 
expenditures in particular, community colleges have taken center stage in policy debates in 
recent years.  
Cornwell et al. (2006) study enrollment patterns at two-year and less-than-two-year colleges 
within the context of Georgia’s HOPE program. Echoing studies on the four-year sector, 
Cornwell et al. find that the grant component of HOPE, distinct from the scholarship component, 
delivers mixed and likely null effects on attendance. Beyond immediate outcomes like 
enrollment, recent work has also studied longer-term outcomes, including persistence, 
graduation, and post-graduation earnings (Welch, 2014; Castleman and Long, 2016). Welch 
(2014), for instance, utilizes Tennessee’s data on community colleges to show that tuition 
reduction has no impact on persistence, academic performance, degree completion, expected 
earnings, or post-college short-term earnings for students bordering on the eligibility threshold.  
These puzzling and somewhat disappointing results are partially attributable to the lack of a large 
shock to identify causal effects. A universal-eligibility tuition-free program like Tennessee 
Promise gives us an ideal natural policy experiment to fill this gap. 
1.2.3. Institutional context: “Promise”-labeled programs and the Tennessee Promise 
“Promise” initiatives, tuition-assistance policies designed to partially resolve the student debt 
challenge, have gained increasing popularity over the past few decades. Earlier forms of these 
programs are typically place-based and privately funded. The most prominent examples include 





merit-based scholarships in merely requiring recipients to graduate from a public high school 
within a particular school district.7 Another category is “state-based” aid programs, which bring 
locally focused programs to a higher level and target a substantially broader audience, as the 
name suggests.8 While local programs have received increasing scholarly attention, relatively 
much less research is done on broad-based programs. 
Existing state-funded promise programs share two common characteristics. First, they typically 
have less rigorous academic requirements (i.e., lower GPA/ACT/SAT scores) than do 
conventional merit-based scholarships. Second, the paperwork burden is substantially lower. 
From our initial discussion of a potential conceptual model, these programs are highly promising 
in boosting college access not only among the most financially needy students but also among 
those from middle-class families and others. The concept of “free college” would clear up any 
disconnect about tuition and net price.  
Tennessee Promise represents one of the premier examples of a promise initiative that fits 
squarely into this framework. The particular design features of Tennessee Promise give us 
sufficient grounds to predict that the program can address credit constraints and information-
related challenges, and generate a desired enrollment response. 
First, as mentioned earlier, Tennessee Promise has a “last-dollar” nature, which entails the state’s 
coverage of residual tuition and fees once funding support from other sources, such as the Pell 
Grant, HOPE scholarship, or Tennessee Student Assistance Award, is exhausted. Although not 
as generous as its “first-dollar” cousins, Tennessee Promise is distinct from many other last-
 
7To our knowledge, El Dorado Promise is the only promise program that financially supports attendance at any 
institution (public or private) in the US. In 2013, the residency requirement was dropped (Miller-Adams, 2015), 
rendering El Dorado Promise even more generous. 
8For a systematic comparison of the different variants of promise programs known to date, we refer readers to Page 





dollar promise programs in that it involves neither an “enrollment cap” (a maximum number of 
aid recipients) nor any additional eligibility criteria beyond state residency.9 As Bell (2018) 
phrases it, Tennessee Promise represents a “deviation from the norm” in that it provides 
comprehensive coverage of tuition and fees with relatively few means-tested requirements. 
Second, the information component is embedded within the design of Tennessee Promise in a 
natural and novel way. Having “Knox Achieves” as its most prominent predecessor, Tennessee 
Promise improves upon the county-level Knox Achieves program in meaningful and important 
ways.10 In particular, recipients of Tennessee Promise dollars must not only maintain full-time 
status and a GPA of 2.0 but are also expected to provide eight hours of community service before 
each enrolled semester.11 Financially supported students are also expected to meet regularly (for 
a total of 10–15 hours in the senior year of high school) with an assigned community mentor, 
who is trained to give them information on the college application process and provide them with 
necessary resources to succeed academically (Carruthers and Fox, 2016; Billings, 2018).  
The last point to be kept in mind in predicting the performance of the Tennessee Promise 
program relative to the likes of Georgia’s HOPE grant concerns timing differences. Whereas 
Georgia’s HOPE grant, at least in its primitive form, does not impose any restriction on when the 
 
9 First-dollar programs do not take into account the students’ eligibility for other funding sources, e.g., the federal 
Pell Grant. As such, under the first-dollar model, students are given greater flexibility in allocating the additional 
dollars net of tuition to pay for housing, childcare, books, and other expenses. More details are available in Perna 
and Leigh (2017). 
10Initiated within Knox County (Tennessee) with the class of 2009, the “Knox Achieves” program does not have any 
eligibility requirements based on either need or merit. Knox Achieves is special in that it features community 
involvement and mentoring as an integral part of its missions. As shown in Carruthers and Fox (2016), participation 
in the program strongly increases the prospects of high school graduation and direct college enrollment. 
11 We emphasize here that any high school student in Tennessee qualifies for the program; the 2.0 GPA threshold is 
only for aid renewal. We also note that this threshold is universal, meaning that continued funding support is 
contingent upon the student earning a 2.0 regardless of which institution he or she is attending. By comparison, other 
programs like Georgia’s HOPE grant (to distinguish it from HOPE’s merit-based scholarship component) and New 





student graduated from high school, delaying enrollment is not an option for Tennessee’s high 
school graduates.12 This difference is likely to matter for many college-bound seniors, especially 
cost-sensitive students, in weighing whether to take advantage of the state’s generous free-
college movement or to attend a four-year university upon high school graduation. 
1.3. Data and methods 
Given our description of the institutional context, we primarily focus on the direct impacts of 
Tennessee Promise on full-time first-time undergraduate enrollment at two-year public 
institutions in Tennessee. Similar to Bruce and Carruthers (2014), however, we also extend the 
analysis of enrollment to the four-year sector in Tennessee as a complementary exercise.13 Bruce 
and Carruthers document little substitutability among different college sectors in the context of 
lottery scholarships. Statewide promise programs feature a larger scope, and therefore, 
enrollment substitutability patterns are expected to be more visible. 
 
The data for all of the empirical analyses that follow are extracted from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System, maintained by the National Center for Education 
Statistics. Our main variable of interest is full-time first-time degree/certificate-seeking 
undergraduate enrollment (FTF henceforth) at degree-granting public two-year colleges during 
 
12 We were informed by a faculty researcher at the University of Tennessee (Department of Economics) who was 
directly involved in the Tennessee Promise project that the application window for community colleges was 
substantially later than the date of announcement of Tennessee Promise, and, more importantly, the programrequired 
immediate enrollment upon high school graduation. Therefore, by the time Tennessee Promise was enacted in the 
entire state in Fall 2015, the program would likely have picked up most of the enrollment responses. 
13We note that a possibly non-negligible proportion of community college graduates may go on to attend the state’s 
four-year college for a terminal bachelor’s degree, rendering it tricky to unpack the true contribution of Tennessee 
Promise from the historical contribution of the two-year sector. Therefore, for future research to deliver a clean 






the fall semesters of 2009–2017.14 Following Saboe and Terrizzi (2019), we incorporate into the 
data-generating process for enrollment the institutions’ time-varying controls, including 
published in-state tuition, student–faculty ratio, and the percentage of full-time first-time 
undergraduate students awarded any financial aid in the previous academic year.15 
 
It is also worth noting that Tennessee was the first state to implement a free community college 
initiative on a large scale. Several other states also enacted their own statewide programs one or 
two years later following Tennessee’s example. Including colleges within these states would not 
significantly increase statistical power but instead may confound our estimations. Therefore, for 
the main analysis, we exclude 4 states, namely Oregon, Minnesota, Kentucky, and Rhode Island, 
which, as of December 2016, had enacted some variant of a large-scale college promise 
program.16 For a robustness check, we follow Dynarski (2000) and select control units from 
states that border Tennessee. 
 
A few methodological remarks are worth discussing in the context of estimating treatment 
effects. In an ideal world, we would compare actual enrollment outcomes at Tennessee’s 
colleges to what they would have achieved in the absence of the program. The latter, however, is 
not observed and thus impossible to calculate.  
 
 
14This time window is chosen following Saboe and Terrizzi (2019), since changes were made to the variables in 
2008. Starting the analysis from 2009 allows us to use systematically collected and consistently defined institutional 
characteristics. 
15 The lagged value is chosen both to reflect a convenient choice on our part (given that IPEDS data on this variable 
is only available up until 2016) and to partially address the endogeneity concern. We note that the results are 
qualitatively and quantitatively robust to various sets of control variables, in either current-time or lagged forms. 





As a first approximation, one could take a simple difference between pre-treatment and post-
treatment outcomes for Tennessee’s institutions. However, failing to account for macro-level 
enrollment trends would likely lead to biases. One could also simply compare enrollment 
outcomes between Tennessee’s institutions and institutions from other states after 2015, when 
the Tennessee Promise program started. However, this approach also potentially suffers from 
biases, as the “true” treatment effect is likely to be confounded by systematic differences 
between Tennessee’s and other states’ colleges that existed even before Tennessee’s initiative 
took place.   
 
As a starting point, we employ a variant of the DID estimator, following Card and Krueger 
(1994), to help address these estimation challenges. Our control group is composed of two-year 
public colleges in other states. Considering our focus on aggregate enrollment patterns, 
institution-level data are also employed in the subsequent generalized synthetic control (GSC 
henceforth) estimations. Our chosen estimators possess an external-validity advantage over local 
estimators, and are justifiable in answering the current research questions. 
1.3.1. DID estimation 
Our main specification is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝜋𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾𝑇𝑁𝑖𝑠 + 𝜆𝐷15𝑡 + 𝛿(𝑇𝑁𝑖𝑠 ∗ 𝐷15𝑡) + 𝒙𝑖𝑠𝑡
′ 𝜷+ 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡, (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡is either the level or natural logarithm of enrollment for college i in state s in year t. 
𝑇𝑁𝑖𝑠 is a binary indicator that takes on the value of 1 if the particular college is located in 
Tennessee and 0 otherwise. 𝐷15𝑡 is a binary indicator for the year of 2015, which marks the start 
of Tennessee Promise, or later.𝜋𝑖 and 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 denote the college and time fixed effects, 





might influence the outcome. 𝒙𝑖𝑠𝑡is the vector of observed time-varying covariates. Of most 
interest is the interaction coefficient 𝛿, which captures the average enrollment effect of the 
Tennessee Promise program on public colleges in the state.17 
1.3.2. The common-trends assumption 
A critical identifying assumption in the DID framework is the common-trends assumption, 
which requires that the outcome variable follow similar trends for treated and untreated units if it 
were not for the treatment. We note that this assumption is not testable, since the potential 
outcome for treated units in the absence of the treatment is not observed. Nonetheless, it is still 
possible to get some insight into the model’s validity by seeing whether different paths already 
exist even prior to the treatment. To be specific, we expect full-time enrollment for both 
Tennessee and non-Tennessee states to follow a common trend before Tennessee Promise was 
enacted. In addition to presenting descriptive historical-average statistics, we also perform a 
formal analysis using an event-study specification: 





+∑∑𝜇𝑥𝑡(𝒙𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) + ∑𝜂𝑥𝒙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑥∈𝒙𝑥∈𝒙𝑡
 
 ∀𝑡 ∈ {2009 − 2017}\{2014}, (2) 
where 𝜋𝑖 denotes the institution fixed effects; 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is a series of binary indicators for each year 
in our sample, except for the year of 2014; 𝑇𝑁𝑖𝑠 denotes a binary indicator that takes on value of 
1 if the college is located in Tennessee and 0 otherwise; and 𝒙𝑖,𝑡−1 is a set of lagged institution-
 
17Whenever the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of enrollment, a consistent estimate of the treatment 
effect is calculated as 100 × (𝑒𝛿 − 1) percent. This quantity is approximately𝛿 × 100 percent, although we note 





level time-varying controls. The standard errors are clustered at the college level to allow for the 
possibility that the model errors are serially correlated and heteroskedastic.  
 
Of most interest is the set of coefficients 𝛾𝑡 on the interaction terms 𝑇𝑁𝑖𝑠 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡, which 
captures the average differences in the outcome variable between treated and control groups for 
each time period. In the Results section, we will provide both unconditional-mean and event-
study graphics to assess the common-trends assumption in relation to DID estimates.  
1.3.3. Generalized synthetic control estimation 
Finally, we consider a more flexible identification strategy and employ the recently proposed 
generalized synthetic control estimator (Xu, 2017). This new estimator, a refinement of Abadie 
and Gardeazabal’s (2003) and Abadie et al.’s (2010) original synthetic control framework, 
possesses a distinct advantage in relaxing the parallel-paths assumption (having “common 
trends” as a special case), which DID critically hinges upon. Xu’s (2017) new estimator is 
especially useful for our application, where enrollment is aggregated at the college level and 
some enrollment time series exhibit unpredictable dynamics even before the intervention.18 
 
Following Xu, we construct the counterfactuals based on a linear interactive model of the form: 
 
18For a complete presentation, we also conduct a synthetic control analysis. In doing this, we first average both the 
outcome and predictor variables by state and year and estimate the model. Following Abadie et al. (2010), we 
employ as predictors the enrollment levels for 2012, 2013, and 2014, in addition to the same set of controls as used 
in our main DID and GSC estimations. We then perform a series of permutation tests to quantify the uncertainty 
associated with the estimated effects. These permutation tests entail running a variety of placebo tests to compare 
the estimated treatment effects for Tennessee and the “placebo” effects for other states. It is important to note that 
Abadie et al.’s synthetic control method is non-parametric, which is essentially different from the generalized 
synthetic control method, which is based on the assumption of latent factors. For inferential reasons, we believe that 
the generalized synthetic control method is a reasonable alternative to Abadie et al.’s method. The graphical results 
for the original synthetic control method are attached as an appendix. Across six plots, it can be seen that the 
estimated gap for Tennessee is unusually larger than the placebo gaps when the same model is applied iteratively to 
the donor states. If one were to select a state at random, the probability of estimating a gap of the magnitude that we 
have observed for Tennessee is very small. Altogether, these results indicate a positive enrollment effect of the 





 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝝀𝑖
′𝒇𝑡 + 𝒙𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜷 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, (3) 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the treatment indicator; 𝒇𝑡 and 𝝀𝑖 denote the vector of unobserved common factors 
and unknown factor loadings of dimension r, respectively; 𝒙𝑖𝑡 is the same set of time-varying 
controls used in the DID specification; and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term with 𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 0. 
Let 𝑌𝑖𝑡(1) and 𝑌𝑖𝑡(0) denote the potential outcomes. The dynamic average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) is then given by: 
 𝐴𝑇𝑇 =
∑ (𝑌𝑖𝑡(1)−𝑌𝑖𝑡(0))𝑖
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
 (4) 
for all units that belong to the set of institutions exposed to the program.  
Xu’s framework relies on the important assumption of strict exogeneity, which requires that the 
error term in any time period be independent of the treatment assignment, observed covariates, 
and unobserved heterogeneities of all units in all periods. Xu argues that this assumption is 
weaker than the standard strict exogeneity assumption in fixed effects models in certain cases 
(such as when the unobserved time-varying confounders are decomposable into a multiplicative 
form). We note, however, that this assumption does not rule out the potential correlation between 
the treatment indicator and the covariates and factor components, signifying a significant 
advantage of the GSC over the standard DID. 
 
Since 𝑌𝑖𝑡(0) in equation (4) is unobservable, Xu (2017) proposes estimating it with a three-step 
procedure that, for identification, requires the normalization and orthogonality of the factors. The 
conceptual estimation framework is summarized in our appendix, and further implementational 
details are explained in the online appendix of Xu (2017). Since the optimal number of included 
factors is typically unknown a priori, cross-validations are implemented prior to calculating the 






As mentioned in Xu’s (2017) paper, one limitation of the GSC estimation framework is the 
“incidental parameters” problem resulting from having either too few control units or too few 
pre-treatment periods (or both). The former possibility appears less worrisome than the latter in 
our case, since while there are several hundred units that are never treated, we have only six pre-
treatment periods. As such, we emphasize that the GSC results presented should still be 
interpreted with caution. Another limitation of our estimation framework concerns excessive 
extrapolation, which can cause the estimated factors and factor loadings to be imprecise. Despite 
offering limited evidence because of the lack of pre-treatment periods, Figure A4 does show an 
upward trend in the estimated factor and some overlap in the factor loadings for treated and 
control units, suggesting that our estimation of the counterfactual path for the outcome variable 
is still meaningful to some extent.  
1.4. Results 
1.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Detailed summary statistics are displayed in Table 1.1. To make these numeric measures more 
informative, Figure 1.1 compares (unconditional) mean two-year enrollment between Tennessee 
and other states over the sample period of 2009-2017. The vertical dashed lines identify 2014 as 
the last pre-treatment period before the Tennessee Promise program commences.  
Overall, the descriptive graphics indicate that prior to the intervention, the two time series for 
enrollment in Tennessee and non-TN states seem to follow similar trends, providing partial 
support for the satisfaction of the common-trends assumption. It also appears that overall 
enrollment experiences an immediate jump after the policy intervention. Hispanic enrollment 





unpredictable trends even before the program takes place. Figure 1.2 complements this 
descriptive evidence by showing the evolution of the estimated interaction coefficients 𝛾𝑡 in the 
event-study specification (2).  
 
Overall, it can be seen that the pre-trends for Hispanic enrollment are fairly stable, while those 
for total and black enrollment exhibit some variability, suggesting that the subsequent DID 
analyses warrant caution. The proposed synthetic control estimator could be a viable recourse in 
this case. As discussed earlier, since the GSC estimator allows for the possibility that the 
outcome paths may feature different pre-treatment dynamics, it provides more general and robust 
estimates than does the standard DID estimator. 
1.4.2. DID estimation results 
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 summarize the results for our main DID analyses both without and with time-
varying controls.  
 
It can be seen that the overall treatment effect from the standard DID framework, represented by 
the estimated coefficient on the interaction term, is fairly consistently positive, signifying that the 
Tennessee Promise program has brought about an increase in average enrollment among the 
state’s public two-year institutions. Subgroup analyses also indicate an increase in enrollment 
among both blacks and Hispanics following the enactment of the program.  
 
Given the distribution of enrollment and taking into account the regression results for both 
enrollment and its natural logarithm, we estimate that the Tennessee Promise program has 





colleges. This result shows a remarkable treatment effect of a financial aid program relative to 
what previous studies have shown in similar contexts. Most relevantly, Carruthers and Fox 
(2016) document an increase in enrollment at community colleges in Knox County following the 
Knox Achieves program on the order of 25 to 30 percent. Likewise, Dynarski (2000) finds a 
“surprisingly large” impact of Georgia’s HOPE program on college attendance among middle- 
and high-income youths. By comparison, Cornwell et al. (2006) show that the same program had 
no statistically significant impact on attendance at Georgia’s two-year colleges. To reconcile this 
discrepancy, it is worth keeping in mind is that Dynarski does not disentangle the influence of 
the grant component (which is intended only for non-degree programs at community and 
technical colleges) from that of the merit-based scholarship component (which has certain 
academic requirements attached to it) when studying the HOPE program.  
1.4.3. GSC estimation results 
Our GSC estimations are conducted upon a strongly balanced panel, with TN institutions serving 
as treated units. The “donor” pool is composed of institutions from the remaining states. The key 
idea behind synthetic control estimation in general is to construct a convex combination of 
control institutions that resembles treated units in pre-intervention periods. To facilitate GSC 
estimation, we exclude from our analysis any college whose data on full-time first-time, black, or 
Hispanic enrollment are missing. We bootstrap the standard errors with 1,000 replications in 
each estimation. Also, for each model, an optimal number of unobserved factors (r*) is selected 
in a Mean Squared Prediction Error sense. Our main GSC results are summarized in Figure 1.5.  
 
The panels show how the average outcomes for both treated units and their synthetic controls 





be noted that the synthetic controls model the pre-treatment dynamics for treated units fairly 
well. Immediately after the treatment, however, the outcome paths diverge. The average 
treatment effects can also be visualized with the accompanying estimated gap plots, which 
together indicate a positive enrollment impact of the Tennessee Promise program. It can be seen 
from Figure 1.5 that the enrollment gap appears to be in the neighborhood of 500, which is 
similar to the DID estimates in Table 1.2.   
1.4.4. Robustness checks 
In this section, we follow Dynarski (2000) and Cornwell et al. (2006), among others, and 
replicate all of the previous analyses using as control units all public two-year colleges in 
Tennessee’s neighboring states. The donor states are Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Virginia. Numerical and graphical results are attached 
in the appendix. The evidence shows that changes relative to the original DID and GSC results 
are qualitatively and quantitatively negligible under an alternative sample restriction.  
 
In sum, the Tennessee Promise program has been shown to create a statistically and 
economically significant impact on the state’s two-year enrollment. Garnering all of the evidence 
so far, taking into account the distribution of enrollment, accounting for time trends, and using 
different control groups, we conservatively estimate that the Tennessee Promise program has 
improved attendance among public two-year institutions in Tennessee by 40 percent, or 






1.4.5. Additional results: Enrollment substitutability 
This section is devoted to examining how enrollment at the state’s four-year public universities is 
affected by the enactment of the Tennessee Promise program. The results are attached in Table 
1.4 and Figures 1.2, 1.4, and 1.6. 
 
We summarize two notable findings from this analysis. First, the program creates a statistically 
significant decrease in four-year enrollment immediately after its first treatment round, providing 
strong support for the enrollment substitutability hypothesis. Second, enrollment bounces back in 
the second round and thereafter, suggesting that the Tennessee Promise program has generated a 
positive medium-run impact of boosting attendance at the state’s public four-year institutions. 
Accumulating the evidence and averaging across periods, we conservatively estimate a 2-percent 
reduction in four-year enrollment, or approximately 100 students per college, following the 
enactment of the program. 
1.5. Concluding remarks 
Community colleges play a crucial role in America’s higher education. Since the graduating 
class of 2015, Tennessee has been providing full tuition and fee support for all high school 
seniors in the state who wish to attend a public two-year college under the so-called “Tennessee 
Promise” initiative. The state has since garnered a reputation as a pioneer in its attempt to make 
two-year colleges free on a broad scale.  
 
In this study, we sought to measure the enrollment effects of such a novel policy. Our estimates 
indicated that, overall, the enrollment responses have been remarkable. To help better understand 





significant increase in attendance among black and Hispanic students and a short-run decrease in 
the state’s public four-year enrollment.  
 
These results make sense, at least conceptually, on several grounds. First, relative to Becker’s 
theoretical framework, Tennessee’s program is likely to increase the probability of attendance 
among marginally motivated students, especially those for whom cost and academic 
preparedness are decisive factors. Second, considering that Tennessee Promise adopts a fairly 
broad-based funding formula, we speculate that there has been significant program participation 
from middle-income or high-income students who are typically ineligible for education subsidies 
that target only a certain group of students. Because of its last-dollar nature, Tennessee Promise 
is unlikely to affect attendance among the lowest-income students, whose funding needs are 
already covered via the federal Pell grant, HOPE grant, and other sources of financial support. 
Moving forward, it is informative to examine behavioral responses at the student level to unpack 
the mechanism behind the aggregate patterns that have been observed in this paper.  
 
It is still premature to declare the program a success, although we are optimistic that at least in 
terms of enrollment, Tennessee Promise has achieved some initial intended effects.19 To 
emphasize, in contrast to prominent income-based programs such as New York Excelsior, any 
high school graduate in Tennessee qualifies for the state’s promise dollars, so long as he or she 
meets a few mild requirements. We speculate that much of the positive enrollment response is 
attributable to the program’s focus on simplicity and to its unique component of mentoring, the 
 
19A holistic evaluation needs to account for the welfare effects of the program and its behavioral externalities, e.g., 
how the program affects consumption-smoothing motives among recipients, how the state’s productivity really 
benefits from a more educated workforce, and how other prices are affected by such a large shock in the price of 
education. For future research to explore this aspect, we recommend a structural approach, with Denning et al.’s 





combination of which is likely to address both credit-constraint and information elements 
missing from traditional frameworks. Disentangling the contribution of each component to the 
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Appendix A: Tables 





Total Black Hispanic 





TN=0 TN=1 TN=0 TN=1 TN=0 TN=1 TN=0 TN=1 
TN=0 TN=1 TN=0 TN=1 
2009 
Mean 
823.32 1,222.69 125.32 250.75 126.91 29.00 2,558.16 2,668.00 21.17 22.62 69.71 78.77 
 
N 
784 13 369 12 369 12 776 13 785 13 782 13 
2010 
Mean 
799.16 1,173.69 127.80 216.38 136.40 26.54 2,693.27 2,853.08 21.35 22.31 73.76 82.92 
 
N 
786 13 786 13 786 13 780 13 787 13 784 13 
2011 
Mean 
761.64 1,113.31 126.94 231.85 139.70 31.46 2,876.00 3,097.23 20.54 21.62 76.91 87.08 
 
N 
787 13 787 13 787 13 782 13 788 13 787 13 
2012 
Mean 
744.01 962.15 119.85 156.31 143.69 32.08 2,997.16 3,240.00 20.07 20.54 79.29 90.77 
 
N 
788 13 788 13 788 13 782 13 789 13 787 13 
2013 
Mean 
745.79 970.54 118.31 160.62 156.29 34.46 3,121.96 3,357.23 19.45 19.85 79.13 92.38 
 
n 
791 13 791 13 791 13 785 13 792 13 791 13 
2014 
Mean 
715.26 1,003.69 107.92 159.77 159.87 43.38 3,234.84 3,528.00 18.96 19.62 79.67 92.62 
 
n 
793 13 793 13 793 13 788 13 794 13 792 13 
2015 
Mean 
687.99 1,506.62 97.07 253.08 159.89 71.54 3,365.06 3,644.54 18.63 19.92 80.09 93.38 
 
n 
795 13 795 13 795 13 790 13 796 13 795 13 
2016 
Mean 
688.95 1,406.77 96.56 230.62 170.40 73.08 3,435.51 3,758.31 18.37 20.31 78.22 94.69 
 
n 
797 13 797 13 797 13 792 13 798 13 797 13 
2017 
Mean 
679.01 1,454.31 94.95 250.46 177.02 84.38 3,533.71 3,847.38 18.29 20.54 77.98 95.46 
 
n 
796 13 796 13 796 13 792 13 798 13 796 13 
 
Note: TN=1 refers to the state of Tennessee; TN=0 refers to non-Tennessee states, excluding Kentucky, Minnesota, Rhode Island, 
and Oregon. Tuition, SF, and Aided stand for published in-state tuition (measured in US dollars), student–faculty ratio, and the 





Table 1.2. DID results for total full-time first-time two-year enrollment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLE





















* 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 
 (22.37) (74.47) (22.06) (73.32) (69.48) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Tuition   -0.02 -0.02 -0.02      
   (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)      
SF ratio   5.56** 5.56** 5.56*      
   (2.74) (2.74) (3.13)      
Percent 
aided   0.68 0.68 0.68   -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
   (0.65) (0.53) (0.46)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log (tuition)        0.09 0.09** 0.09* 
        (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
Log (SF 
ratio)        0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 











* 6.32*** 6.32*** 4.76*** 4.76*** 4.76*** 
 (12.94) (8.57) (53.41) (57.37) (69.23) (0.02) (0.01) (0.49) (0.34) (0.42) 
Observations 7,234 7,234 7,177 7,177 7,177 7,234 7,234 7,105 7,105 7,105 
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Institutions 810 810 806 806 806 810 810 798 798 798 
Std. errors S-clust C-clust S-clust C-clust Boot S-clust C-clust S-clust C-clust Boot 
 
Note: FTF denotes the level of full-time first-time enrollment. Institution fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all of the specifications. The standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. S-clust, C-clust, and Boot stand for “clustered at the state level,” “clustered at the college level,” and “bootstrapped,” 






Table 1.3. DID results for enrollment by demographic group 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Enrollment Black Black Black Black Black Hisp Hisp Hisp Hisp Hisp 
TN*D15 75.91*** 75.91*** 72.73*** 72.73*** 72.73*** 15.88 15.88* 12.87 12.87 12.87 
 (4.30) (22.52) (3.88) (22.02) (20.95) (13.95) (8.81) (14.30) (8.79) (8.78) 
Tuition   -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01**   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
SF ratio   3.08*** 3.08*** 3.08***   -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
   (0.83) (0.51) (0.51)   (0.41) (0.65) (0.69) 
Percent aided   0.22 0.22* 0.22*   0.84 0.84*** 0.84*** 
   (0.15) (0.12) (0.13)   (0.51) (0.19) (0.19) 
Constant 127.54*** 127.54*** 67.15*** 67.15*** 67.15*** 111.11*** 111.11*** 69.94** 69.94*** 69.94*** 
 (6.14) (3.56) (18.16) (15.21) (17.68) (17.18) (5.45) (30.74) (26.04) (23.93) 
Observations 6,818 6,818 6,766 6,766 6,766 6,818 6,818 6,766 6,766 6,766 
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Institutions 810 810 806 806 806 810 810 806 806 806 
Std. errors S-clust C-clust S-clust C-clust Boot S-clust C-clust S-clust C-clust Boot 
 
Note: Institution fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all of the specifications. The standard errors are shown in parentheses. S-clust, C-clust, and 
Boot stand for “clustered at the state level,” “clustered at the college level,” and “bootstrapped,” respectively (*** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1). All computations 






Table 1.4. Enrollment substitutability analysis 
(effects of the Tennessee Promise program on the state’s public four-year enrollment) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLE
S 










TN*D15 -93.79*** -93.79 -
113.43**
* 
-113.43 -113.43 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(29.62) (106.64) (32.55) (95.94) (128.85) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Tuition 
  
0.05** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
     
   
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
     
SF ratio 
  
29.28*** 29.28*** 29.28*** 
     
   
(5.29) (3.31) (2.96) 




-1.07 -1.07 -1.07 
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 
   
(0.76) (0.85) (0.86) 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log (tuition) 
       
0.02 0.02 0.02         
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Log (SF 
ratio) 
       
0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 
        











6.91*** 6.91*** 5.26*** 5.26*** 5.26*** 
 
(24.19) (11.33) (121.62) (96.82) (116.14) (0.01) (0.01) (0.32) (0.29) (0.26) 
Obs 6,021 6,021 5,979 5,979 5,979 6,021 6,021 5,902 5,902 5,902 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Institutions 682 682 680 680 680 682 682 675 675 675 
Std. errors S-clust C-clust S-clust C-clust Boot S-clust C-clust S-clust C-clust Boot 
 
Note: FTF denotes the level of full-time first-time enrollment. Institution fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all of the specifications. The standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. S-clust, C-clust, and Boot stand for “clustered at the state level,” “clustered at the college level,” and “bootstrapped,” 







Figure 1.1. Mean full-time first-time public two-year enrollment for Tennessee and other 
states, 2009–2017. 








Figure 1.2. Mean full-time first-time public four-year enrollment for Tennessee and other 
states, 2009–2017. 








Figure 1.3. Event-study graphics 
Note: Each panel graphs point estimates of the interaction coefficients 𝛾𝑡 from the event-study specification in 








Figure 1.4. Event-study graphics for public four-year enrollment 
Note: Each panel graphs point estimates of the interaction coefficients 𝛾𝑡 from the event-study specification in 












Figure 1.5. Treated and counterfactual averages for the GSC two-way additive fixed-effects 
models 
Note: This table shows the graphics for the main GSC results with the same set of controls as in the DID 
estimations. The left column shows the treated averages and counterfactual paths, and the right column shows the 
associated gap series in terms of years relative to the intervention. In each estimation, cross-validations are 
employed for objectivity in model selection. An optimal number of unobserved factors (r *) is selected in the Mean 
Squared Prediction Error sense, and the standard errors are bootstrapped with 1,000 replications. Parallel computing 
is used to improve efficiency. Other technical details are discussed in the text and in Xu’s (2017) online appendix. 







Figure 1.6. Treated and counterfactual averages for the GSC two-way additive fixed-effects 
models (public four-year institutions) 
 
Note: This table shows the graphics for the main GSC results with the same set of controls as in the DID 
estimations. The left column shows the treated averages and counterfactual paths, and the right column shows the 
associated gap series in terms of years relative to the intervention. In each estimation, cross-validations are 
employed for objectivity in model selection. An optimal number of unobserved factors (r *) is selected in the Mean 
Squared Prediction Error sense, and the standard errors are bootstrapped with 1,000 replications. Parallel computing 
is used to improve efficiency. Other technical details are discussed in the text and in Xu’s (2017) online appendix. 






Appendix C: Additional results 
Table 1.5. DID results for full-time first-time two-year enrollment following Dynarski’s (2000) sample restrictions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLE





















* 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 
 (13.12) (75.29) (12.81) (74.06) (72.79) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Tuition   0.01 0.01 0.01      
   (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)      
SF ratio   11.12*** 11.12*** 11.12***      
   (1.79) (2.96) (3.26)      
Percent 
aided   0.03 0.03 0.03   -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
   (0.49) (0.87) (0.64)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log (tuition)        0.07 0.07 0.07 
        (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Log (SF 
ratio)        0.27** 0.27*** 0.27*** 











* 6.24*** 6.24*** 5.09*** 5.09*** 5.09*** 
 (23.61) (14.64) (76.46) (101.05) (75.23) (0.03) (0.02) (0.91) (0.66) (0.62) 
Observations 1,893 1,893 1,888 1,888 1,888 1,893 1,893 1,888 1,888 1,888 
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Institutions 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 
Std. errors S-clust C-clust S-clust C-clust Boot S-clust C-clust S-clust C-clust Boot 
 
Note: This table replicates the main result using two-year public institutions in TN’s neighboring states as control units. FTF denotes the level of full-time first-






Table 1.6. DID results by demographic group following Dynarski’s (2000) sample restriction 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
FTF Black Black Black Black Black Hisp Hisp Hisp Hisp Hisp 
TN*D15 88.00*** 88.00*** 85.58*** 85.58*** 85.58*** 32.71*** 32.71*** 29.43*** 29.43*** 29.43*** 
 (5.22) (23.01) (4.22) (22.53) (24.49) (2.50) (8.47) (3.20) (9.27) (10.69) 
Tuition   -0.00 -0.00 -0.00   0.01 0.01 0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
SF ratio   5.25*** 5.25*** 5.25***   0.18 0.18 0.18 
   (0.90) (1.11) (1.19)   (0.36) (0.32) (0.30) 
Percent aided   0.06 0.06 0.06   0.31 0.31* 0.31* 
   (0.13) (0.27) (0.25)   (0.28) (0.17) (0.18) 
Constant 185.07*** 185.07*** 80.13** 80.13** 80.13** 20.92*** 20.92*** -28.07 -28.07 -28.07 
 (13.70) (8.50) (29.37) (34.07) (33.24) (4.80) (4.13) (31.74) (36.27) (28.41) 
Observations 1,805 1,805 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,805 1,805 1,800 1,800 1,800 
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Institutions 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 
Std. errors S-clust C-clust S-clust C-clust Boot S-clust C-clust S-clust C-clust Boot 
 
Note: Institution fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all of the specifications. The standard errors are shown in parentheses. S-clust, C-clust, and 
Boot stand for “clustered at the state level,” “clustered at the college level,” and “bootstrapped,” respectively (*** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1). All computations 






Figure 1.7. Mean full-time first-time undergraduate enrollment at public two-year 
institutions in Tennessee and neighboring states (2009-2017) 







Figure 1.8. Event-study graphics following Dynarski’s (2000) sample restriction 
Note: Each panel graphs point estimates of the interaction coefficients 𝛾𝑡 from the event-study specification in 








Figure 1.9. Estimated treated and counterfactual averages for the GSC two-way additive fixed 
effects models following Dynarski’s (2000) sample restriction 
Note: This table shows graphics for the robustness GSC results using neighboring states’ two-year institutions as control 
units. In each estimation, cross-validations are employed for objectivity in model selection. An optimal number of 
unobserved factors (r *) is selected in the Mean Squared Prediction Error sense, and the standard errors are bootstrapped 
with 1,000 replications. Parallel computing is used for efficiency. Other technical details are discussed in the text and in 

















Figure 1.11. Synthetic control results in the spirit of Abadie et al. (2010) 
Note: This figure shows a summary of synthetic control results following Abadie et al.’s (2010) method. The top 
panel indicates raw averages, treatment-effect estimates, and the estimated gap, respectively. The bottom panel 
shows the outcome paths for Tennessee and synthetic Tennessee, p-values comparing the main effect to the placebo-
effect distribution, and the standardized p-values, respectively. The predictors of enrollment include Tuition, SF 
ratio, Percent aided, and the enrollment levels for 2012, 2013, and 2014. The red vertical line identifies 2014 as the 


















This paper studies a large policy change in the US postsecondary education system to shed light 
on whether and how public provision of higher education makes colleges more ethnically 
diverse. I first use institution-level data to construct three metrics of diversity, namely the share 
of underrepresented minorities in the student body, Simpson’s index, and Shannon’s index. 
These measures each reflect a disparate dimension of diversity yet altogether yield a unified 
framework to understand the construct. I then leverage the staggered timing of statewide “free 
college” programs across states to document these programs’ impacts on college diversity. 
Employing different quasi-experimental methods, I show that free-college programs have not 
catalyzed an economically significant effect on the demographic composition of public two-year 
colleges, although initial results do offer grounds for optimism. The paper’s findings 
complement recent work, which has documented the early success of promise programs in 
encouraging community college enrollment. To this end, I propose several mechanisms to 
rationalize the current results and provide several policy implications to improve practice.  
 
Keywords: diversity; free college; IPEDS; higher education 
List of abbreviations. ATT: average treatment effect on the treated; DID: difference-in-
differences; GSC: generalized synthetic control; IPEDS: Integrated Postsecondary Education 







“Inequitable distribution of educational resources throughout the educational 
pipeline prompts cumulative deficits in wealth and cultural means for social 
mobility. Unintended consequences of US financial aid policy illustrate how such 
inequities historically have led to disparities in life outcomes for various groups.” 
(Davis, Green-Derry and Jones, 2013) 
2.1 Introduction 
Equity, inclusion, and diversity are long-standing issues in America’s higher education. To 
ensure equal and equitable access to educational resources and promote a college-going culture, 
concerted efforts in increasing college affordability have been made at multiple levels. Over the 
past few decades, many financial aid programs have been designed and implemented. These 
initiatives constitute a sizable portion of taxpayer dollars spent on higher education every year.20 
Among the criticisms of conventional financial aid vehicles, which encompass need-based grants 
and merit-based HOPE scholarships, are their various and often elaborate eligibility 
requirements. Such requirements may turn away many students who wish to demand further 
education yet are discouraged by the complex application hurdle. Recent theory and evidence 
have highlighted a shift away from the traditional model toward a simpler framework in aid 
determination. The idea of “free college” emerged (or more precisely, resurfaced) against this 
backdrop. While manifesting themselves in multiple forms, statewide free-college programs 
 
20According to Layzell (2007), higher education usually accounts for the largest share in states’ discretionary 
spending (“discretionary” in the sense that this portion is legally mandatory) regardless of economic conditions. 
Within this category, state governments have been a major funder of public institutions’ operational funds and 
postsecondary programs such as student financial aid. The National Association of State Budget Officers reports that 








typically provide, at a minimum, full tuition support, and involve few requirements for eligibility 
and renewal beyond state residency. 
The current study seeks to shed light on whether and how statewide free-college programs affect 
diversity in the student bodies of public institutions. The standard economic justifications for 
increased diversity in higher education are based upon the premise that diversity generates both 
private and social returns. There are, however, other reasons to desire and promote diversity 
beyond economic benefits. For one, diversity may be important in aligning state citizens’ 
demands for higher education with the mission of public institutions to serve every group. State 
policymakers may also care about diversity if they perceive higher education as a critical part of 
social mobility. Viewed this way, a statewide free-college movement represents a state’s 
commitment to socioeconomic equity for all. 
 
In this study, I focus on the two-year college sector, which enrolls a large number of minority, 
first-generation, and low-income students.21 Students attending two-year institutions also face a 
substantially different set of challenges relative to their four-year counterparts. Except for New 
York’s Excelsior program (which supports both two- and four-year students), all free-college 
programs implemented between 2015 and 2018 focus on the two-year sector. The best evidence 
to date indicates that despite some variation in effectiveness, statewide free-community-college 
programs are highly promising in encouraging college attendance and completion (Perna& 
Smith, 2020). However, little is known about the overall effects of these programs on the 
sociodemographic diversity of the states’ colleges. Filling this literature gap, my research 
 
21 Detailed statistics are available in College Board’s (2016) report entitled “Trends in Community Colleges: 







enriches the modest yet rapidly expanding academic evidence on free-college programs.22 In 
doing so, the study also contributes to the broader public policy discourse regarding 
affordability, inclusion, and diversity.  
 
To date, research on college financial aid has contributed to much of what we know about the 
educational trajectories of low-income, non-traditional, and underrepresented students.23 
However, due in part to the variance in findings and differences in focus across studies, this work 
has failed to deliver a conclusive and systematic framework to think about diversity (Dynarski & 
Scott-Clayton, 2013; Boatman & Long, 2016; Anderson et al., 2019). Another important factor 
that limits the progress of this literature is the questionability of the diversity measures 
employed, if any (Tienda, 2013). Most studies have only looked at narrow sets of financial aid 
beneficiaries separately without any explicit treatment of diversity. To this end, the current study 
joins the efforts of Hinrichs (2011, 2012), Gándara& Li (2020), and others, in reshaping the way 
diversity is typically understood in higher education settings.  
 
I re-examine this very construct and argue that there is more to diversity than an emphasis on a 
select group. I look beyond the “share of underrepresented minorities” (“URM” henceforth), and 
employ several other metrics borrowed from ecologists, to better understand diversity. In 
 
22 The prologue of Perna& Smith’s (2020) book provides a quick summary of recent advances in this literature. 
23Given that financial factors play a key role in dropout decisions among college students, the provision of financial 
aid is expected to be effective in reducing dropout risks among students from marginalized groups (Chen, 2008, 
Asplund et al., 2008; Chapman, 2005; Martin, 2005; Long, 2007). However, this sentiment is not shared by critics of 
the existing financial aid system, which is itself believed to serve traditional students only by design (Long, 2009; 
Castellano & Overman, 2009; Choitz &Widom, 2003; Baum, 2006; Lapovsky, 2008; St. John & Tuttle, 2004). In 
Chen &Hossler’s (2016) argument, although financial aid may encourage non-traditional students to stay in school, 
it is unlikely to ensure timely completion of a college degree among this population. In reconciling this debate, 
Deming & Dynarski (2009) provide a comprehensive review of causal evidence from an economic perspective. 
Recent research has continued illuminating the role of financial aid in improving college persistence (Allen 
&Wolniak, 2019; Smith, 2020). The focus of the discussion has also been shifted to age diversity and the 






essence, these new measures take into account the uncertainty associated with finding two 
members of the population with a common ethnic background and hence reflect the “exposure to 
other races” aspect of belonging to a diverse group. Putting together disparate dimensions of 
diversity within the same analysis, the research provides a comprehensive treatment of the 
concept and adds more context and nuances to the ongoing public policy discussions.  
 
To provide additional insights, I supplement the main analysis with separate case studies of 
individual promise programs. In fall 2015, the state of Tennessee began providing free tuition 
and fees to its community college students, becoming the first state in the nation to implement a 
statewide free-college program. Several other states have followed in Tennessee’s footsteps and 
implemented their own variants of free college. Irrespective of the findings, an examination of 
whether and how the Tennessee Promise and other programs that model on it have changed the 
postsecondary landscape in terms of student diversity is expected to provide important lessons 
for policymakers, and this study is among the first to undertake such an initiative.  
 
I employ a combination of program-evaluation methods to provide a holistic and objective 
assessment of the “treatment effect” of the free-college movement. While modeling assumptions 
and control groups vary from specification to specification, these methods all leverage the timing 
of these programs to construct the counterfactuals. The sufficiently long post-intervention 
window provides an opportunity to study medium-run impacts of free college beyond immediate 
outcomes such as first-time enrollment. Altogether, the results show that the diversity effects of 







To put the research in perspective, recent statistics have shown that America’s undergraduate 
population is becoming more diverse than ever.24 Despite this encouraging trend, racial 
disparities in college access and success remain a major policy issue. For instance, looking at 
over 200 indicators, the American Council on Education sees “stagnant and low” levels of 
college participation and educational attainment for many communities of color.25 Echoing this 
concern, the National Center for Education Statistics also reports that certain groups such as 
American Indians/Alaska Natives continue to be underrepresented in overall enrollment and that 
the relative ranking across demographic groups has remained almost unchanged over the past 
decade.26 To my knowledge, diversity is not emphasized in most existing statewide free-college 
programs, suggesting that there is room for a fundamental change in policy design.  
2.2  Background on college diversity 
At present, many public institutions and organizations are taking active steps to promote 
diversity. At the national level, for instance, the American Association of Community Colleges, 
which represents almost 1,200 two-year, associate degree-granting institutions, explicitly 
designates diversity as one of its core values, and sets specific milestones for meeting the diverse 
needs of its 12 million students. As another example, the Tennessee Board of Regents, which 
 
24According to a report by the National Center for Education Statistics, between 2000 and 2016, the share of whites 
in the undergraduate population has fallen from 70 to 56 percent, whereas the share of Hispanic students has 
increased by 9 percentage points to 19 percent (https://nces.ed.gov/blogs/nces/post/new-report-shows-increased-
diversity-in-u-s-schools-disparities-in-outcomes). At roughly the same time, from 2000 to 2017, the percentage of 
the college-age population (18-24 years old, as per NCES’ definition) which was White decreased from 62 to 54 
percent, while the percentages of other races/ethnicities increased 
(https://nces.ed.gov/programs/raceindicators/indicator_RAA.asp). 
25 The report, entitled “Race and ethnicity in higher education: a status report executive summary”, was retrieved 
from: https://1xfsu31b52d33idlp13twtos-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/REHE-Exec-
Summary-FINAL.pdf.  
26 According to the report, “[t]he college enrollment rate in 2018 was also higher than in 2000 for those who were 
White (42 vs. 39 percent)…In every year between 2000 and 2018, the college enrollment rate for those who were 
Asian was higher than the rates for those who were White, Black, and Hispanic, and the rate for those who were 
White was higher than the rate for those who were Black. The college enrollment rate for those who were White was 
also higher than the rate for those who were Hispanic in every year between 2000 and 2018, except 2016, when the 






supervises all public two-year colleges in the College System of Tennessee, also makes it formal 
under the authority of T.C.A. § 49-8-203 that diversity and equity are to be observed throughout 
the system. 
 
In its broadest sense, “diversity” refers to any differences across individuals who belong to a 
common group. In the current context, this construct can be operationalized in terms of the 
differences in race, ethnicity, gender, beliefs, and other dimensions, which are exhibited by 
students attending the same college. Having various demographic groups represented in the 
student body signals that a college is promoting a collaborative and inclusive culture. This might 
in turn have important implications for outreach, endowment, and public relations, in addition to 
the pure educational benefits. From the students’ perspectives, diversity in the classroom 
facilitates civil academic exchange. Having diverse classmates also helps eradicate harmful 
stereotypes and prepares students for an increasingly globalized and diversified workforce 
(Bowman, 2010). This point is particularly salient for community colleges, which enroll many 
non-traditional and minority students. 
 
Previous researchers have expressed concerns that the absence of diversity may undermine 
policy interventions and exacerbate the “White privilege” in the college classroom. For instance, 
using mixed methods to study a community service learning program, Seider et al. (2013) find 
that white participants are more likely to engage in race discussions with their classmates than 
are students of color. The authors also suggest that the lack of representation may hinder the 
learning of all students. Much as diversity matters to the learning process, it has also been 






&Vigdor (2010) estimate the economic returns to attending a racially diverse college in terms of 
educational attainment and post-graduation earnings. Rooted in Becker’s (1964) human capital 
model, Lazear's (1995) model of cultural assimilation, and Borjas’ (1992, 1995) model of 
productivity spillovers, Arcidiacono &Vigdor formalize Justice Lewis Powell’s hypothesis that 
diversity promotes an “atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment, and creation' so essential to the 
quality of higher education.” “Diversity capital,” as coined by Arcidiacono &Vigdor, essentially 
refers to the idea that individuals in a diverse group not only enjoy the within-group productivity 
spillovers, but also create extra surplus that benefits the group as a whole as well. Diversity is 
therefore viewed by many as an asset to the workplace.27 
 
However, for completeness it should be noted that while the conceptual arguments for increased 
diversity in educational settings are sound, empirical evidence for them is mixed. In reviewing 
the evidence on the returns to diversity, Arcidiacono &Vigdor (2010) document that despite 
some evidence on the positive effects of classroom racial composition and educational quality at 
primary and secondary levels (Hanushek et al. 2003; Hoxby 2000), the link between racial 
diversity and education is weak. The impact of diversity in higher education, according to 
Arcidiacono &Vigdor (2010), is primarily “correlational.” Boisjoly et al. (2006) and Carrell et al. 
(2019) provide notable exceptions. In a randomized roommate-assignment field experiment, 
Boisjoly et al. find that exposing first-year college students to roommates from different races 
causes individual students to be more empathetic and racially aware. Likewise, Carrell et al.’s 
(2019) random assignment in the U.S. Air Force Academy reveals that exposing white freshmen 
to black peers raises the probability of choosing a black roommate in the sophomore year and 
 
27 There is extensive evidence from well-identified management studies that links diversity to better workplace 
outcomes. See McMahon (2010), Nielsen (2010), Joshi et al. (2011), Menz (2012), and most recently, Roberson et 






largely fosters future intergroup contact. By contrast, many other studies document null and even 
negative effects (Alesina& La Ferrara, 2000; Gugerty & Miguel, 2005; Vigdor, 2004). These 
contrary findings highlight the need to comprehensively assess both the determinants and 
implications of diversity. 
2.3 The free-college idea and its implications for diversity 
One of the primary arguments in support of free-college programs is the clear message that they 
convey: any state resident can acquire a higher education degree if one so chooses. Proponents of 
statewide free-college programs also argue that since the benefits of higher education extend far 
beyond individual betterment and contribute greatly to our civilization, higher education should 
be viewed as a public good and should be provided free of charge (Goldrick‐Rab& Steinbaum, 
2020). Just as free-college programs are regularly featured in political and media discussions, 
these programs are also extoled as a “higher education funding revolution” in academic forums 
(Davidson et al., 2020).  
Economically speaking, a tuition subsidy is expected to affect an individual’s ability to pay for 
college and subsequent enrollment decision. Allen & Wolniak (2019) analyze IPEDS data for 
both four-year and two-year public institutions within a fixed-effects multivariate framework to 
document that the relationship between tuition increases and US institution’s racial/ethnic 
composition is consistently and significantly negative, although with heterogeneous effects 
among different subsamples. Looking beyond the US context, Bietenbeck et al. (2020) also 
document a negative effect of tuition fees on university enrollment through a natural experiment 
in Germany. However, in a recent meta-analysis, Havranek et al. (2018) find that the overall 
enrollment effect of tuition is close to zero once publication biases are controlled for. One 






does not substantially alter behavior among many student groups, it might have far-reaching 
consequences on others. In particular, since underrepresented minority groups have relatively 
low incomes, providing them with a full-tuition subsidy will likely remove this source of 
heterogeneity and equalize access to educational opportunity. 
Opponents of free-college programs cast doubt on the fairness implications of these programs, 
positing that free college serves “no real egalitarian purpose” (Bruenig, 2015). This criticism 
stems from the mere fact that by design, almost all statewide programs in existence are of a “last-
dollar” nature, which entails the states’ coverage of the residual amount of tuition after all other 
sources of aid have been exhausted (Perna& Leigh, 2017). A potential issue with this model is 
that it might result in higher student debt from room and board borrowing. Judging by the way 
they are rolled out across states, existing programs might also be favoring well-off students over 
disadvantaged ones, considering that the latter group is already supported via other means of aid, 
and that other college-related expenses usually account for a larger proportion of a student’s 
budget than does tuition.28 Therefore, while last-dollar free-college programs are expected to 
change the enrollment pattern of middle-class students, who are otherwise ineligible for low-
income education subsidies, the effects among both the poorest and most affluent students might 
be negligible. Similar to the argument that Hinrichs (2012) makes in the affirmative-action 
context, it is likely that a universal, race-blind free college program might not achieve its 
diversity goals, even if it fares well in other aspects, such as enrollment and persistence. 
 
28 For instance, half of Tennessee Promise recipients receive $0 in aid, according to the “Tennessee Promise students 
at community colleges: The Fall 2015 cohort after five semesters.” report, retrievable from 
https://www.tbr.edu/sites/tbr.edu/files/media/2018/05/TBR_TNPromise_2015_2.pdf. A recent report states that 
“non-tuition expenses make up more than half the cost of college and they increase year over year,” suggesting that 
college tuition and fees, even if transparently published, often obscure the large indirect costs of attendance. For full 
closure, this report was prepared by uAspire, an organization that strives to make colleges more affordable. We do 






Another way in which a free college program might not be all that desirable lies in the way it is 
rolled out. To date, out of almost 20 statewide promise programs and almost 400 free-college 
programs in total, only a few programs, including the Tennessee Promise, explicitly feature 
“coaching” or “mentoring” as an integral design component. This might be problematic, since 
offering tuition support to students without any form of guidance or support would be analogous 
to giving them only a means to survive without helping them thrive. Given that many community 
college graduates will transfer to a four-year institution to complete a bachelor’s degree, the 
transitional burden might become a hindrance to the academic progress and full social 
integration of scholarship recipients, defying the very notion of “free college.”29 
 
Combining these arguments, it follows that while free-college programs do remove certain 
barriers, its real implications for diversity are ambiguous. In line with the heterogeneity in 
enrollment, high school graduation, earnings, and other outcomes, which has been attributed to a 
variation in policy design by researchers studying different free-college programs (Bell, 2020; 
Gándara& Li, 2020), the diversity effects of these programs are context-dependent. It is thus 
recommended that states contemplate comprehensive evidence prior to implementing free-
college policies on a large scale. 
 
 
29 What further obfuscates the picture lies in the substantial heterogeneity in the way “free college” is comprehended 
and executed across states. Whereas many statewide programs apply a fairly broad funding formula, others have 
restricted their targets to only certain fields of study. For instance, Arkansas’s ArFuture Grant and South Dakota’s 
Build Dakota program require recipients to be enrolled in a high-demand field (such as STEM) for eligibility. 
Kentucky’s Work Ready Kentucky Scholarship Program even specifies five areas that the program can support, 
namely health care, advanced manufacturing, transportation/logistics, business services/IT, and construction.While 
their future effects are uncertain, these programs do reflect the incumbent states’ clear focus on building a skilled 
workforce and a technologically advanced economy. The message embedded within these types of programs should 








The last point to be kept in mind in predicting the diversity performance of free-college 
programs concerns students’ access to financial aid information, which deserves a separate 
consideration from the access to aid itself. In a large-scale field experiment, Dynarski et al. 
(2018) target Michigan’s low-income high-school students and study the effect of a tuition 
guarantee on the probabilities of admission and enrollment at a highly selective public 
institution. Students in the treatment group were promised four years of tuition and fees if 
admitted to the state’s flagship University of Michigan without any requirement to complete 
financial aid forms. Importantly, the researchers do not vary the amount of grant aid, but instead, 
the information about what opportunities are already available for eligible students. The 
information intervention is found to raise application and enrollment rates substantially, 
suggesting that even a simple (yet credible) tuition promise can go a long way in motivating poor 
students. This experiment fits squarely into Page & Scott-Clayton’s (2016) theoretical 
framework, which emphasizes the need to simplify existing financial aid programs. Related to 
my earlier point, not only will free college narrow the income gap but, if properly executed, it 
will also have the potential to remove other barriers in higher education and ultimately, improve 
student diversity.  
2.4 Data and methods 
2.4.1. Data 
The data for this study are extracted from the Integrated Postsecondary Education System 
(IPEDS). The main outcome of interest is fall undergraduate enrollment counts by race/ethnicity 
for all public two-year institutions in the United States (excluding US territories) for the 
academic years 2010-2011 through 2018-2019. This time window is chosen for consistency of 






(as per the National Center for Education Statistics’ categorization) are missing, since these 
counts are critical to my construction of the diversity metrics. To facilitate the empirical 
implementations that follow, I also exclude a very small fraction of institutions whose important 
time-varying characteristics are missing for any year in the sample. The final analytic sample is a 
strongly balanced panel of 830 colleges for a total of 7,470 observations. 
2.4.2. Diversity metrics 
I consider a number of metrics that reflect different dimensions of diversity. Due to the 
normalizations, it should be kept in mind throughout that a larger index corresponds to a higher 
degree of diversity. 
2.4.2.1.Coarse measure 
I first consider a basic measure of diversity following Hinrichs (2012): 
𝑈𝑅𝑀 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 100(𝑏𝑖 + ℎ𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖)                         (1), 
where 𝑈𝑅𝑀 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 stands for “share of underrepresented minority populations in the student 
body” at college i. b, h, and n represent the respective fractions of blacks, Hispanics, and Native 
Americans represented at a particular institution. This measure, an analog of the concentration 
ratios in industrial economics, connotes the potential effects of interacting with URM students.  
While it is easy to interpret, this measure is disadvantageous in that it fails to reflect the 
“exposure to variety” dimension of diversity (Hinrichs, 2011). For instance, many students from 
underrepresented demographic groups select themselves into enrollment at minority-serving 
institutions, composing a large proportion of the student body at these institutions. Therefore, a 
large value of 𝑈𝑅𝑀 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 might obscure the fact that only a few races are present in the total 






2.4.2.2.More refined measures 
To complement the previous measure, this section introduces two more elaborate measures of 
diversity borrowed from biology and other fields. An ecosystem is considered “highly diverse” if 
the typical species is at least somewhat rare; that is, “no small number of species being much 
more abundant than the rest” (Schilling, 2002). Simpson’s diversity index is constructed as 
follows: 
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖 =∑𝑝𝑗(1 − 𝑝𝑗)
𝑘
𝑗=1
                   (2) 
where p represents the proportion of each racial group and k indexes the number of groups 
represented in the population total. This measure captures the extent to which different races are 
represented in the student body (Hinrichs, 2011). Intuitively, if one is to randomly pick two 
students in the student body of college i, then this index shows the likelihood that these two 
students come from different demographic groups. It is noteworthy that this measure bears 
resemblance to (the opposite of) the familiar Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industry 
concentration typically used in producer theory. As an alternative, I consider Shannon’s diversity 
index: 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑖 = −∑𝑝𝑗ln (𝑝𝑗)
𝑘
𝑗=1
                    (3) 
where 𝑝𝑗ln (𝑝𝑗) = 0 if 𝑝𝑗 = 0. This index is known as Shannon’s entropy in physics and 






Simpson’s and Shannon’s diversity indices are more informative than the coarse measure of 
URM share in that they emphasize rareness, an important aspect of diversity. Further, these 
measures also possess desirable theoretical properties that substantially facilitate interpretation. 
In particular, for a fixed number of groups, the two indices are both minimized (i.e., there is 
absolutely zero diversity) when there is only one group that makes up the whole population. By 
contrast, maximum diversity is achieved when all groups are represented in the population with 
equal probability.  
2.4.3. Empirical models 
2.4.3.1.DID specifications 
I start the analysis with a basic DID specification of the form: 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛿 𝐷𝑠𝑡 + 𝒙𝑖𝑠𝑡
′ 𝛃 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡(4) 
where 𝑌 is one of the aforementioned measures of diversity in year t for college i located in state 
s. 𝜇 and 𝜆 represent the college and year fixed effects, controlling for time-invariant determinants 
and macro-level time trends that might influence college diversity, respectively. 𝐷 is the 
treatment indicator (Treated), a binary variable that indicates whether a state implements a free-
college program in a given year.𝒙 is the vector of time-varying controls. All other, non-
systematic determinants of college diversity are subsumed into the error term. The parameter of 
interest is 𝛿, which, under the assumption of common trends, identifies the effect of the free-
college initiatives on student diversity at the state’s public two-year colleges. 
2.4.3.2.The common-trends assumption 
In the potential-outcomes framework, to interpret the parameter 𝛿 in the above equations as the 
average treatment effect of the free-college movement, we must assume that the evolutions of the 






intervention. This assumption is not testable or verifiable, since it is conceptually impossible to 
observe the potential outcome for actually treated units in a hypothetical world without the 
program. However, researchers usually have more confidence in the accompanying regression 
results if prior to the intervention, the outcome paths for treated and control groups are similar. 
To assess the common-trends assumption, I present unconditional-average graphics, in addition 
to a formal regression-based event study of the form: 












𝕀(𝑡 < 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑠 + 𝑗) if 𝑗 = 𝑗
𝕀(𝑡 = 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑠 + 𝑗) if 𝑗 ∈ (𝑗; 𝑗)
𝕀(𝑡 > 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑠 + 𝑗) if 𝑗 = 𝑗
 
In this notation, 𝕀(. ) is the indicator function and 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑠 denotes the time period in 
which the free-college policy is implemented in state 𝑠. The interaction coefficients represent the 
average differences in the level of the outcome between treated and control groups for each year. 
In this regression, the standard errors are clustered at the college level to allow for potential 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity of the model errors (Bertrand et al., 2004).  
2.4.3.3.(Model-based) generalized synthetic control estimation 
This section considers a relaxation of the common-trends assumption in the DID framework. 
Following Xu (2017), I specify a linear interactive model of the form: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝒙𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜷 + 𝜆𝑖
′𝑓𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡(6), 
where the subscripts i and t index the colleges and years in the sample, respectively. D is a binary 






otherwise. 𝒙 denotes the vector of predictors whose length corresponds to the number of 
unknown parameters in 𝛽 = [𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑘]
′. 𝜆 = [𝜆1, … , 𝜆𝑟] is an [𝑟 × 1] vector of unknown factor 
loadings (that is, the unit-specific intercepts) and 𝑓 represents the vector of unobserved common 
factors with length 𝑟. The most important term in the above equation is the factor component 
𝜆𝑖
′𝑓𝑡, whose generality can accommodate a wide range of unobserved heterogeneities, with the 
conventional unit and time fixed effects as a special case.30 Intuitively, the factor component 
absorbs all unobserved confounders that are decomposable into a unit-year multiplicative form, 
i.e., 𝑈𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 × 𝑏𝑡, including, for instance, college-specific gender norms, culture, and political 
partisanship, but is not able to capture unobserved confounders that are independent across units. 
The idiosyncratic disturbances capture the remaining (random) unobserved time-varying 
determinants of college diversity.  
Suppose 𝑇0 denotes the last pre-treatment time period. As in other Rubin-type causal-inference 
frameworks, let 𝑌𝑖𝑡(1) and 𝑌𝑖𝑡(0) be the potential outcomes of treated units. The average 











         (7) 
The quantity of interest is 𝛿𝑖𝑡. To identify this parameter and interpret it as the causal effect of 
the free-college initiative, the model critically assumes strict exogeneity. “Strict” here dictates 
that the idiosyncratic error term of any unit at any time is orthogonal to the treatment assignment, 
time-varying characteristics, and unobserved cross-sectional and intertemporal heterogeneities of 
both the unit itself and all units in all time periods. While this assumption may appear restrictive, 
 
30 Note that for the case of 𝑟 = 2, with 𝜆𝑖
′ = (1; 𝛼𝑖) and 𝑓𝑡
′ = (𝜆𝑡; 1), the factor component reduces to just 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡, 






it is indeed weaker than other strict-exogeneity versions typically required by fixed effects 
models in the presence of decomposable time-varying confounders, and if satisfied, it 
automatically satisfies the familiar conditional mean independence assumption. It can also be 
noted that in the GSC framework, the treatment indicator is allowed to be correlated with the 
time-varying characteristics and unobserved factor component for all units at any time period, 
thereby relaxing one of the common assumptions in regression-based DID frameworks and 
signifying a significant advantage of Xu’s generalized synthetic control approach.  
To estimate 𝛿𝑖𝑡, Xu proposes a three-step procedure, which is summarized in the appendix. In 
essence, GSC estimation imputes the treated counterfactuals from a linear interactive fixed-
effects model. The number of factors, factor loadings, and latent factors are selected via cross-
validation, relying on information from both treated and control groups in pre-treatment periods. 
The standard errors are bootstrapped, with 1,000 replications in each estimation. In this manner, 
Xu’s procedure makes efficient use of the data and requires minimal subjectivity. 
2.4.3.4.Canonical synthetic control estimation 
Finally, I consider another data-driven estimation approach to analyze individual free-college 
states separately. In this analysis, college-level outcomes are averaged to the state level. This 
exercise bears very close resemblance to the case study exemplified in Abadie &Gardeazabal’s 
(2003) seminal paper. Therefore, for brevity I exclude the theoretical exposition and refer readers 
to the appendix of that paper.  
Intuitively, the synthetic control in the spirit of Abadie &Gardeazabal’s (2003) and Abadie et al. 
(2010) works in the following way. Imagine in a pool of states, only one state receives the 
treatment (this state is called the “treated” state) at one point in time and remains to be treated 






units and constitute the so-called “donor pool”). In all case studies, I exclude any other states that 
receive the treatment at any time during the sampled period. 
The quantity of interest is the average treatment effect, or the difference between the actual 
outcome and the counterfactual outcome for the (same) treated state. Since the latter term is 
unobserved, the synthetic control method essentially estimates it by creating a “synthetic 
control,” or the best convex combination of control units that matches the observed 
characteristics of the actually treated unit (“best” in the sense of minimizing a loss function). 
Inference is conducted by hypothetically exposing each donor state to the intervention in an 
iterative fashion and calculating the probability of obtaining a treatment effect that is as large as 
that for the treated state.  
2.5. Power analysis and minimum detectable effect considerations 
Emerging evidence suggests that most reported treatment effects in economic research are under-
powered and suffer from exaggeration bias (Ioannidis et al., 2017). To place the results from the 
empirical analysis in perspective, I undertake an ex ante power analysis based on pre-treatment 
data for all colleges in the sample. In particular, this data is used to obtain an estimate of the 
overall unexplained variation in the dependent variable(s), which is conditional on the basic 
specification (i.e., inclusion of fixed effects and/or control variables), as well as an estimate of 
the intraclass correlation (i.e., the fraction of the variance due to within-college variation). These 
variance measures are, in turn, used to calculate minimum detectable effect sizes based on 80% 
power, a 5% significance level, and a difference-in-differences identification strategy.  
The power-analysis results are presented in Table 2.4. For the URM Share, the minimum 






to detect a treatment effect as small as 1 percentage point with at least 80% power. The obtained 
minimum detectable effect sizes for the other diversity measures are also fairly reasonable, 
relative to their distributions. Additional details on the power analysis are provided in the 
appendix. 
2.6.  Main results 
2.6.1. Descriptive statistics 
The summary statistics for the analytic sample are presented in Table 2.1. Figures 2.1-2.4 are 
provided as visual complements to make these numeric measures more informative. Figure 2.1 
shows the pairwise correlations among the three diversity metrics of interest. As expected, the 
Simpson and Shannon indices are highly correlated. The URM Share measure does not exhibit a 
strong correlation with either of these measures, although the relationship is positive (as shown) 
and statistically significant (not shown) in both cases. The figures that follow display the 
evolution of diversity in public two-year colleges in treated free-college states and those in 
never-treated states. It can be seen from the raw data that overall, demographic diversity in the 
two-year sector has not changed significantly. 
2.6.2. Event-study estimates 
The results for OLS estimation of the event-study specification are provided in Table 2.3, and the 
accompanying graphics are shown in Figure 2.4. Despite some pre-treatment variability, it can be 
seen that the post-treatment changes in the outcomes are negligible.  
2.6.3. DID results 
The main DID results are provided in Table 2.5. Irrespective of statistical significance, one can 
observe that the coefficient on the treatment indicator is largely not economically significant, 






2.6.4. DID results accounting for urban status and county-level demographics 
Given the state-based rolling out of free-college programs, one would naturally expect some 
treatment heterogeneity. In the United States, the majority of public community college students 
attend institutions in proximity to where they live. A large statewide financial aid policy would 
have two main effects. A priori, the policy’s diversity impacts are expected to be more 
pronounced in community college districts or counties whose pre-existing demographics are 
relatively diverse, even if the student bodies of the local colleges are not. A more subtle channel 
is that under a statewide program, as opposed to an in-district or college-level one, scholarship 
recipients are given substantially more flexibility in their locational choices. As such, the former 
effect might be amplified by many rural students choosing to enroll at urban colleges for better 
job prospects, enhanced social capital, and other opportunities, while pursuing their community 
college education.  
 
For robustness and to examine the possibility that the diversity effects of free college may have 
geographic variation, in addition to the treatment indicator I include an interaction term in the 
estimating equation. I consider first the interaction between the treatment variable and college-
level urban-centric indicator using the US Census’ definitions. I then match the current dataset to 
county-level 5-year estimates of the Black and Hispanic populations from Table DP05 of the 
American Community Survey Demographic and Housing (US Census Bureau, 2020).  
Disregarding statistical significance, the results from Table 2.6 suggest that the policy has had 
some locational effects, although the direction is slightly counterintuitive. One possible 






effect, whereby rural community colleges may enroll a higher share of low-income students than 
do urban colleges in the first place. If this channel prevails, then it is possible that rural 
institutions experience a larger diversity effect of a statewide tuition subsidy. The difference, 
however, is not economically meaningful. Overall, the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients 
on the treatment indicator as shown in both Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 are fairly consistent with 
those from the main results.  
2.6.5. Diversity effects of free college among less diverse institutions 
Similar to an argument made earlier, statewide free-college programs, unlike district-based 
tuition scholarships, might induce student mobility within states. An interesting question then 
arises as to whether the diversity effects of these programs vary depending on the pre-existing 
diversity profiles of individual colleges or groups of colleges.  
To explore this possibility, I conduct two simple exercises to complement the insights from the 
main findings. Specifically, I look at the “least diverse” institutions which I define narrowly as: 
(1) those with at least 80% whites represented in the student body, or (2) those with a share of 
URM less than 20%. These two categories might overlap, but not completely. I run separate 
difference-in-differences regressions for these two groups. The results from Table 2.8 suggest 
that the treatment effects are mildly, yet consistently, positive across all measures of diversity. 
2.6.6. Generalized synthetic control estimation results 
Generalized synthetic control estimation results are visualized through Figure 2.5. Across all 
three panels, it can be seen that the actual average series overlaps the counterfactual path almost 
completely both prior and subsequent to the free-college intervention. This suggests that the free-
college movement has not substantially improved diversity at the affected institutions, and 






2.6.7. Case studies of statewide free-college programs 
Figures 2.6-2.8 display results for the case studies of individual free-college programs using the 
original synthetic control estimation procedure. The figures indicate that with the exception of 
Tennessee Promise, which has generated a weak increase in the share of underrepresented 
minorities at the state’s two-year colleges, all three measures of diversity have not experienced 
dramatic changes in post-intervention periods. The implications of the empirical findings will be 
discussed in the following section. 
2.6.8. Broader impacts: racial composition of degree completers and overall public college 
enrollment 
I now explore degree completion and total public college enrollment as an initial attempt to get at 
the longer-run and overall diversity impact of free-college programs. This analysis merits 
consideration since one of the ultimate foci of community colleges in the United States is 
academic preparedness for four-year transfer. State policymakers might therefore care about how 
financial aid policies affect diversity not only among two-year institutions, but also four-year 
public universities.  
While important, this exercise is somewhat more challenging than are the previous explorations 
due primarily to the difficulty in defining “treated” units. As mentioned earlier, the first 
statewide free-college program emerged in the state of Tennessee in the fall of 2015, followed by 
a series of similar initiatives undertaken by other states. Additionally, the beneficiaries of these 
programs are individual students, who, as indicated in the institutional description, can make 
enrollment decisions without regard to strict district boundaries as in the context of local 
scholarships. These two facts together lend partial support to causal identification in making it 






however, they open up the possibility that certain colleges in an eventually treated state might be 
“treated” earlier or later than other colleges in that state. Further, since our focus is now shifted 
from immediate diversity effects to longer-run and more general outcomes, it might make sense 
to consider a more flexible identification strategy that does not impose a strict pre-post cutoff. To 
this end, I follow James and Smith (2017) and Cunningham et al. (2020), and estimate a 
semiparametric specification in which I allow the treatment effect to vary over time as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = ∑ 𝛿𝜏(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝜏 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑠)
𝜏∈{2010(2011)−2018(2019)}\2014
+ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 × 𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡             (8), 
where 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝜏 is a year indicator equal to one if τ = t and zero otherwise. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑠 indicates 
whether a college is located in an eventually treated state. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 × 𝑡 are the state-level linear 
trends. The main benefit of this specification is that it allows seeing how the outcomes unfold 
over time, as opposed to having this dynamic treatment effect collapsed into a single coefficient. 
In the words of Cunningham et al. (2020, page 5) and James and Smith (2017, page 130), this 
specification is somewhat preferable to and “more informative” than a conventional pre-post 
difference-in-differences model when pre-post periods are unclear from the context.  
The set of 𝛿𝜏 in the above equation signifies the average difference between treatment and 
control colleges in year τ, relative to the difference in the omitted year 2014. Standard errors for 
all regressions are clustered at the college level. The results from Figures 2.10 and 2.11 show 
that in aggregate, free-college programs have not increased the share of degree completers from 
ethnic groups that are commonly considered to be underrepresented (which consist of blacks, 






both two- and four-year enrollment) has been trending gradually upward, at least for the Simpson 
and Shannon indices. Although the treatment effect is generally not statistically significant, it is 
moving in the positive direction, offering some optimism about the future course of college 
diversity. 
2.7. Concluding remarks 
This study assessed the extent to which statewide free-college programs, a large recent financial 
aid innovation, have changed diversity outcomes in the US postsecondary landscape. 
Conceptually, subsidizing high school students with full tuition might remove income 
heterogeneity and encourage students from marginalized backgrounds to demand higher 
education. However, the presence of other frictions might limit the success of such a noble goal. 
Using a combination of program-evaluation methods, I provided new evidence showing that the 
“free-college” initiative has not substantially increased demographic diversity among public two-
year colleges.  
 
In interpreting this result, several caveats should be kept in mind. First, what has been presented 
in the paper pertains to a short- and medium-run equilibrium, while students’ college-going 
decisions and college choices are often part of long-term planning. Clearly, it is possible that 
while the positive effects of free-college policies are absent in the short run, these programs have 
potential for long-run success. Methodologically speaking, while reasonable attempts have been 
made to provide a holistic assessment of the treatment effect, concerns regarding statistical 
power of the proposed estimation strategies remain. In particular, the null results in the 
generalized synthetic control and case studies might have been an artefact of underpowered 







Given these limitations, the study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it poses and 
takes initial steps to address a novel and timely question. In doing so, the paper provides a 
potential framework to think about diversity – an integral component of higher education – in 
general terms. These preliminary endeavors will lay the foundations for both theoretical and 
methodological extensions in future research.  
 
The paper also offers several implications for practice. In particular, the United States has long 
been known for its large racial disparity in educational attainment and lack of socioeconomic 
mobility. Just as certain ethnic groups, including African Americans and Native Americans, are 
overrepresented in occupations that require low formal education, these groups have been 
historically underrepresented in America’s postsecondary institutions. The current findings 
suggest that financial support is not the sole path to increased access and diversity in higher 
education. Despite the promising initial outcomes reported by recent researchers such as Gándara 
& Li (2020) and Nguyen (2020), non-financial barriers remain. To emphasize a previous point, 
among the various explanations for the persistence of the opportunity gaps in higher education 
attainment is the perception that the current financial aid system is designed to serve only certain 
groups, including traditional students (Chen &Hossler, 2016). Similar to Hinrichs’ (2011) 
argument in the affirmative action context, it is unlikely that this perception will change in the 
absence of a bold attempt to improve diversity and representation. However, what we can change 
in the foreseeable future, according to Dynarski et al. (2018), Page & Scott-Clayton (2016), and 






and administering financial aid to encourage more students from underrepresented backgrounds 
to attend college.  
 
The study’s findings also highlight the need for policymakers to be explicit about diversity goals 
in designing free-college programs, and modern financial-aid interventions in general. As 
discussed in the conceptual framework, a diversity-focused program might emphasize 
demographic representation, or it can focus on the academic aspect of diversity. It is important to 
note that these two goals are neither necessarily mutually exclusive, nor in conflict with each 
other. In regard to an “optimal” level of diversity for a particular institution, a structural model 
that incorporates both students’ and colleges’ preferences for diversity, as well as how diversity 
is related to learning, human capital accumulation, and labor market outcomes, will have many 
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Appendix A: Tables 
Table 2.1. Summary statistics for the analytic sample 
 
 Whole sample (n = 830) Never treated (n = 689) Eventually treated (n = 141) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Diversity Metrics       
URM Share 31.12 22.49 33.295 22.753 20.508 17.695 
Simpson 4,869 1,759 4,971.861 1,743.265 4,365.326 1,750.489 
Shannon 101.7 34.06 103.268 33.991 94.096 33.385 
Demographic Composition       
AIAN 0.0276 0.117 0.030 0.124 0.015 0.075 
Asian 0.0341 0.0570 0.033 0.054 0.037 0.071 
Black 0.138 0.159 0.144 0.164 0.106 0.122 
Hisp 0.146 0.174 0.158 0.182 0.084 0.101 
NHPI 0.00269 0.00848 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.018 
White 0.577 0.243 0.558 0.242 0.668 0.226 
More-than-2-races 0.0247 0.0321 0.022 0.020 0.038 0.062 
Unknown 0.0413 0.0549 0.042 0.055 0.038 0.054 
Nonresident 0.00912 0.0168 0.009 0.017 0.009 0.015 
Other Characteristics       
Pell Last Year 39.51 14.14 38.927 14.549 42.363 11.534 
Graduation Rate 13.60 11.52 13.454 11.830 14.304 9.837 
Tuition Fees 3,827 1,968 3,751.105 2,104.755 4,196.653 994.721 
Retention 58.53 9.217 58.971 9.490 56.397 7.385 
SF Ratio 19.36 5.918 19.390 6.229 19.228 4.069 
Urban 0.75 0.43 0.745 0.436 0.780 0.414 
 
Note: The analytic sample includes 830 public two-year colleges (2010-2018). Data are extracted from the IPEDS at the NCES. URM Share, Simpson, and Shannon are the different diversity indices 
described in the text. AIAN (American Indians and Alaska Natives), Asian, Black, Hisp, NHPI (Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders), White, More-than-2-races, Unknown, and Nonresident represent 
the respective proportions of each demographic group in the student body. Pell Last Year is the percentage of students receiving Pell grant support in the previous academic year. Graduation Rate is the 
percentage of students graduating within 100% of the normal timeframe. Tuition Fees is the total published in-state tuition and fees. SF Ratio is the student-faculty ratio. Urban is a binary indicator of 
being located inside either an urban area or an urban cluster, as per US Census Bureau’s definitions and NCES’ newly adopted classification. More details are available at 






Table 2.2. List of states with free-college implementation dates 
 
State First treated cohort 
Tennessee Fall 2015 
Minnesota Fall 2016 
Oregon Fall 2016 
Hawaii Fall 2017 
Arkansas Fall 2017 
Kentucky Fall 2017 
Nevada Fall 2017 
New York Fall 2017 






Table 2.3. Event-study regression estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
URM Share URM Share Simpson Simpson Shannon Shannon 
t ≤ -5 -1.76 -2.06 -419.59 -396.19 -6.46 -6.06  
(1.91) (1.90) (314.31) (309.60) (5.65) (5.60) 
t = -4 -1.18 -1.48 -380.05 -347.79 -6.14 -5.66  
(1.71) (1.72) (278.02) (275.15) (5.01) (4.99) 
t = -3 -0.81 -1.19 -297.28 -261.91 -4.85 -4.32  
(1.38) (1.39) (231.83) (230.91) (4.18) (4.18) 
t = -2 -0.58 -0.89 -256.37 -228.66 -4.23 -3.81  
(1.00) (1.01) (172.04) (171.34) (3.06) (3.05) 
t = -1 -0.27 -0.37 -133.80 -104.20 -1.82 -1.33  
(0.53) (0.54) (92.03) (92.31) (1.63) (1.63) 
t = 1 0.58 0.72 54.83 29.13 0.55 0.08  
(0.61) (0.61) (99.41) (99.19) (1.76) (1.75) 
t = 2 1.70 2.14* 212.15 159.32 2.58 1.70  
(1.24) (1.25) (187.72) (190.44) (3.33) (3.35) 
t = 3 1.10 1.76 48.60 12.54 -0.55 -1.43  
(1.66) (1.65) (261.76) (263.57) (4.66) (4.68) 
Observations 1,269 1,269 1,269 1,269 1,269 1,269 
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 
Std. errors College College College College College College 
With controls NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 
Note: This table shows event-study least-squares regression models estimated using Stata version 16.1 with the command reghdfe (Correia, 2017). The omitted 
reference category is the first “treated” period. Time lags past the 5th period are subsumed into a single category. The clustered standard errors are in parentheses, 








Table 2.4. Minimum detectable effects for difference-in-differences models 
 
 (1) (2) 
 DID without controls DID with controls 
URM Share 1.0851 1.0721 
Simpson 151.2261 151.0328 
Shannon 2.8600 2.8553 
 
Note: This table shows minimum detectable effects for the power analyses of the proposed difference-in-difference 
models with an assumed power of 0.8, statistical significance level of 0.05, and equal standard deviations for both 
the treatment and control groups in the treatment period. The standard deviation is derived from a random-effects 
estimation using pre-intervention (i.e., 2010-2014) data only, and is approximated as √𝑠2 + 𝑠2 − 2𝑠2𝜌, where 𝑠 is 
the overall standard deviation (i.e., the square root of the sum of the within- and between-variances), and 𝜌 is the 
intraclass correlation. The sample sizes used for all power computations are the average numbers of colleges in the 
control (n1 = 741) and treatment (n2 = 89) groups, respectively. To facilitate interpretation, the pre-intervention mean 
values of URM Share, Simpson Diversity, and Shannon Diversity for eventually treated states are 19.50, 4,167.62, 
and 89.97, respectively. The pre-intervention mean values of URM Share, Simpson Diversity, and Shannon Diversity 







Table 2.5. Difference-in-differences results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 URM Share URM Share Simpson Simpson Shannon Shannon 
Treated -0.02 -0.13 206.44*** 207.77*** 3.10*** 3.16*** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (39.54) (39.50) (0.73) (0.73) 
Observations 7,470 7,470 7,470 7,470 7,470 7,470 
R-squared 0.22 0.26 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.21 
Number of 
colleges 830 830 830 830 830 830 
Std. errors College College College College College College 
W/ controls NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 
Note: Each column represents a fixed-effect estimation with the year indicators included in all specifications. 
The clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). All computations 






Table 2.6. Difference-in-differences results: heterogenous effects by urban status 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 URM Share URM Share Simpson Simpson Shannon Shannon 
Treated 0.16 -0.04 246.20*** 246.74*** 3.47** 3.56** 
 (0.57) (0.59) (73.64) (74.04) (1.37) (1.39) 
Treated ×
 Urban -0.23 -0.12 -50.59 -49.62 -0.47 -0.51 
 (0.62) (0.64) (82.35) (83.09) (1.52) (1.54) 
Observations 7,470 7,470 7,470 7,470 7,470 7,470 
R-squared 0.22 0.26 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.21 
Number of 
colleges 830 830 830 830 830 830 
Std. errors College College College College College College 
W/ controls NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 
Note: Each column represents a fixed-effect estimation with the year indicators included in all specifications. The 
clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). All computations are 







Table 2.7. Difference-in-differences results: accounting for county-level demographics 
 





Share Simpson Simpson Shannon Shannon 
Treated 0.27 0.15 226.54*** 228.41*** 3.42*** 3.49*** 
 (0.28) (0.28) (40.25) (40.18) (0.73) (0.73) 
County Hisp-Black 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
Treated × County Hisp-Black -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 
R-squared 0.24 0.27 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.23 
Number of colleges 824 824 824 824 824 824 
Std. errors College College College College College College 
W/ controls NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 
Note: Each column represents a fixed-effect estimation with the year indicators included in all specifications. 
The clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). All computations 







Table 2.8. Difference-in-differences results: effects among less diverse colleges 
 
PANEL A:  (1) (2) (3) 
Prop (White) > 80% URM Share Simpson Shannon 
Treated 0.36 158.82** 2.53* 
 (0.31) (76.87) (1.31) 
Observations 1,638 1,638 1,638 
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.33 
Number of colleges 182 182 182 
Std. errors College College College 
PANEL B:  
URM Share < 20% URM Share Simpson Shannon 
Treated 0.51* 117.80** 1.27 
 (0.27) (56.91) (0.99) 
Observations 2,979 2,979 2,979 
R-squared 0.24 0.23 0.34 
Number of colleges 331 331 331 
Std. errors College College College 
 
Note: Panel A shows estimation results for the main DID specification for colleges that had the proportion of White 
students in the student body of at least 80% in 2014. Panel B shows estimation results for the main DID 
specification for colleges that had the URM share in the student body of at most 20% in 2014. Each column 
represents a fixed-effect estimation with the year indicators included in all specifications. The clustered standard 
errors are shown in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). All computations are executed in STATA 









Appendix B: Figures 
 
Figure 2.1. Pairwise correlations among three diversity metrics 
 
Note: This figure shows correlations between each pair of the three diversity measures of interest. The histogram for 
each measure is shown on the diagonal. Below the diagonal are the bivariate scatter plots with respective fitted lines. 
On the top part of the diagonal are the corresponding numeric correlation coefficients, which signify the strengths of 







Figure 2.2. URM Shares for eventually treated and never-treated groups 
 
Note: This figure compares the average URM Share between public two-year colleges in free-college states and 
those in never-treated states. The dashed vertical line denotes the last year prior to the statewide implementation of 









Figure 2.3. Simpson diversity for eventually treated and never-treated groups 
 
Note: This figure compares the average Simpson index between public two-year colleges in free-college states and 
those in never-treated states. The dashed vertical line denotes the last year prior to the statewide implementation of 









Figure 2.4. Shannon diversity for eventually treated and never-treated groups 
 
Note: This figure compares the average Shannon index between public two-year colleges in free-college states and 
those in never-treated states. The dashed vertical line denotes the last year prior to the statewide implementation of 







Figure 2.5. Event-study graphics 
 
Note: This figure presents event-study coefficients for the event indicator, with time periods past the 5th lag 
collapsed into a single coefficient. The figure is generated in Stata version 16.1 following Stevenson 










Figure 2.6. Generalized synthetic control estimation results 
 
Note: This table summarizes the main GSC results. “FC” stands for “free college.” The left column shows treated 
averages and their counterfactual counterparts, and the right column shows the associated gaps. Cross-validations 
are employed in model selection throughout, and the standard errors bootstrapped with 1,000 replications in each 
estimation. Other technical details are discussed in the text and in Xu’s (2017) online appendix. All computations 
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Figure 2.7. Synthetic control results in ADH’s (2010) framework: URM Share 
 
Note: This figure summarizes synthetic control results following Abadie et al.’s (2010) method. The left panel in each subplot indicates raw averages for the state 
of study and its synthetic control. The right panel shows p-values comparing the main effect to the placebo-effect distribution. In addition to the time-varying 
covariates used in the previous estimations, the set of predictors also includes URM shares for three years prior to the statewide free-college intervention. The red 
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Figure 2.8. Synthetic control results in ADH’s (2010) framework: Simpson Diversity 
 
Note: This figure summarizes synthetic control results following Abadie et al.’s (2010) method. The left panel in each subplot indicates raw averages for the state of 
study and its synthetic control. The right panel shows p-values comparing the main effect to the placebo-effect distribution. In addition to the time-varying covariates 
used in the previous estimations, the set of predictors also includes Simpson diversity measures for three years prior to the statewide free-college intervention. The red 
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Figure 2.9. Synthetic control results in ADH’s (2010) framework: Shannon Diversity 
 
Note: This figure summarizes synthetic control results following Abadie et al.’s (2010) method. The left panel in each subplot indicates raw averages for the state of 
study and its synthetic control. The right panel shows p-values comparing the main effect to the placebo-effect distribution. In addition to the time-varying covariates 
used in the previous estimations, the set of predictors also includes Shannon diversity measures for three years prior to the statewide free-college intervention. The red 









Figure 2.10. Diversity among two-year degree completers 
 
Note: This figure shows the effects of statewide free-college programs on the ethnic profile of public two-
year degree completers. Each plot displays the result of a semiparametric regression with each of the 
diversity measures as the dependent variable (from left to right: URM Share; Simpson Diversity; Shannon 
Diversity). Each point on the graph represents the treatment effect estimate for the respective year, relative 









Figure 2.11. Diversity with respective to overall (two-year and four-year) enrollment 
 
Note: This figure shows the effects of statewide free-college programs on the ethnic profile of public two-
year and four-year colleges combined. Each plot displays the result of a semiparametric regression with 
each of the diversity measures as the dependent variable (from left to right: URM Share; Simpson Diversity; 
Shannon Diversity). Each point on the graph represents the treatment effect estimate for the respective 









Appendix C: Summary of power analysis 
The quantity of interest is the difference in the differences between treated and control units 
before and after the free-college intervention. Therefore, in performing the power analysis, it 
is essential to know the standard deviation of this difference. 
Recall that the variance of the difference between two random variables 𝑥 and 𝑦 is: 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥 −
𝑦) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦) − 2𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑠𝑥
2 + 𝑠𝑦
2 − 2𝜌𝑥𝑦𝑠𝑥𝑠𝑦, where 𝜌𝑥𝑦, 𝑠𝑥, and 𝑠𝑦 are the 
correlation, standard deviation of 𝑥, and standard deviation of 𝑦, respectively. If the 
variances of 𝑥 and 𝑦 are the same, then the variance of the difference reduces to 2𝑠2(1 − 𝜌). 
The standard deviation of the difference is the square root of this variance, or simply 
𝑠√2(1 − 𝜌).  
In approximating 𝑠 and 𝜌, we first estimate a random-effects model. Importantly, estimation 
is conducted on pre-intervention data only. After the model is estimated, the within-variance, 
between-variance, and intraclass correlation are obtained to derive 𝑠 and 𝜌. Specifically: 





where 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑤 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑏 are the estimated within- and between-variances from the random-
effects model, respectively.  
Considering the staggered nature of the treatment’s timing, for simplicity we assume that the 
control and treatment groups’ sizes are the average numbers of colleges in the control and 
treatment groups in post-periods, respectively. To calculate the minimum detectable effect 
size for the difference in differences, we assume a power of 80% and statistical significance 
level of 5%. The procedure is summarized as follows:  
Step 1: Estimate the random-effects model using pre-treatment data only.  
• Obtain the intraclass correlation (𝜌) 
• Obtain the standard deviation of the total variance (𝑠) 
Step 2: Compute the standard deviation for the DID analysis, that is, 𝑠𝐷 = 𝑠√2(1 − 𝜌) 
Step 3: Calculate the minimum detectable effect size for a two-sample means test using as 
sample sizes the average numbers of colleges in the control (n1 = 741) and treatment (n2 = 
89) groups, respectively, assuming a power of 0.8, significance level of 5%, and standard 







Chapter 3. When in America, do as the Americans? The evolution of health behaviors 











This study seeks to understand US immigrants' health-related behaviors and outcomes across 
arrival cohorts. We simultaneously examine risky consumption choices (smoking and 
drinking) and physical health conditions (asthma, diabetes, vision problems, and coronary 
heart diseases) using data from the National Health Interview Surveys (1989-2018). We 
incorporate cohort fixed-effects and the interactions between cohort effects and years since 
immigration into our empirical framework to capture the dynamics of immigrant health over 
time. For all health indicators, we find that there are important differences between arriving 
immigrants and natives. Despite some heterogeneity in the dynamics of unhealthy behaviors, 
this heterogeneity seems to dissipate as we explore longer-term health outcomes. Overall, our 
findings provide an interesting outlook on how the integration into the host society affects 
American immigrants' health. We contribute new results to the immigrant assimilation 







Evidence suggests that first-generation immigrants have made a remarkable contribution to 
the US productivity and economic prosperity (Becerra et al., 2012, Sequeira et al., 2018).  
However, the health disparity between US-born and foreign-born citizens perpetuates and 
remains an important public health challenge (Bustamante et al., 2019, Dickman et al., 2017, 
Fernandez and Rodriguez, 2017). Immigrants in the US are frequently blamed by the media 
for putting negative cost pressures on native taxpayers and health service users (Akdenizli et 
al., 2012). However, the academic literature has shown that immigrants, upon arriving in the 
country, are younger and healthier than their American counterparts and less likely to utilize 
health care (Goldman et al., 2006). This paradox is conventionally known as the “healthy 
immigrant effect.” Interestingly, despite the initial health advantage over natives in both 
home and host countries, immigrants' health deteriorates with time spent in the host country 
(Akbulut-Yuksel and Kugler, 2016, Antecol and Bedard, 2006, Giuntella and Mazzona, 
2015). This pattern might be explained by self-selection and socio-cultural protection, which 
lead initially healthy immigrants to converge to lower health standards as they assimilate 
with the new living conditions and customs (Antecol and Bedard, 2006, Jasso et al., 2004, 
McDonald and Kennedy, 2004, Riosmena et al., 2003).  
The assimilation in health outcomes can also be reconciled with the slower convergence in 
earnings and increased exposure to unhealthy behaviors that later arrival cohorts exhibit due 
to their lower socioeconomic status (Borjas, 2015, Pampel et al., 2010). Similar trends are 
observed for several countries and across numerous health indicators (Antecol and Bedard, 
2006, Leung, 2014). Of interest to both scholars and policymakers, therefore, are not only 







One of the few papers that examine both of these aspects is Giuntella and Stella (2017). 
Focusing on the spread of obesity among US immigrants, Giuntella and Stella show that 
more recent immigrant cohorts arrive with higher obesity rates and experience a faster weight 
gain. This finding is consistent with America's reputation as a highly obese country and 
partially confirms the notion that healthier immigrants converge toward worse health. 
Drawing upon Giuntella and Stella’s empirical framework, we contribute to both academic 
and policy discourse on immigrant health in several ways. First, we extend Giuntella and 
Stella’s analysis to explore not only time differences in unhealthy behaviors across arrival 
cohorts but also heterogeneity over a broad spectrum of health outcomes. This analysis 
provides a more in-depth outlook on the health trajectories that pertain to each immigrant 
cohort and places what previous research has found on obesity into a more holistic 
perspective. In particular, we look at cohort effects and assimilation patterns in asthma, 
diabetes, vision problems, and coronary heart diseases. These health conditions are perceived 
to be driven by both genetic and environmental interactions, as opposed to congenital factors 
alone. 
Second, in addition to these long-run health outcomes, we also analyze short-run behavioral 
dynamics among US immigrants by studying their drinking and smoking habits over time. 
Drinking and smoking are two interesting and important indicators to investigate since they 
are two “direct” consumption choices, rather than represent an upshot of the complex 
interaction among different individual decisions. Studying these behaviors brings us one step 
closer to unpacking the mechanism of how physical well-being among different immigrant 






Finally, previous evidence on American immigrants has documented a differential impact of 
smoking and alcohol consumption across different subpopulations, which stems from 
familial, social, and institutional factors (Bui, 2013, Eitle et al., 2009, Leung, 2014, Warner 
et al., 2010). Unfortunately, very little is known about the process of assimilation and its 
potential heterogeneity across different arrival cohorts and/or health behaviors. Even less is 
known about the potential differing patterns across health indicators. Shedding light on these 
aspects is crucial for evaluating the costs and benefits of immigration, and, in particular, its 
impact on the healthcare system. In this regard, our paper contributes to a better 
understanding of immigration policy in the United States. 
3.2. Data and methods 
For the empirical analyses that follow, we employ nationally representative repeated cross-
section individual-level data from the National Health Interview Surveys (NHIS)--formerly 
Integrated Health Interview Surveys--conducted by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
maintained for public use at the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) by the 
University of Minnesota. Rather than a compilation of separate statistics, the NHIS microdata 
system records multiple health and educational characteristics within a harmonized system. 
NHIS sampling procedures consist of two main steps: first, about 40,000 households are 
selected at random; then, one adult and one child are sampled from the participating 
households for health-related questions. More information is available in Thompson (2014) 
and a full description of the sampling procedures is available on IPUMS website.31 
 
One distinctive feature of the data which is most pertinent to our current research design is 








time (1989-2018).32 With 30 years of annual data, we are able to make cross-cohort 
comparisons and get a comprehensive outlook on how immigrant health evolves over time.33  
 
Following similar works in the literature (Antecol and Bedard, 2006, Borjas, 2015, Giuntella 
and Stella, 2016) and to ensure the representativeness of the sample, we restrict the 
observations to individuals aged 25-65 years that migrated to the US after the age of 18 
years. We also exclude from the sample any individual with missing data for age, years since 
migration, and year of arrival. 
3.2.1. Dependent variables 
For analytical purposes, we examine several dependent variables, which can be placed into 
two broad categories--health behaviors and health outcomes. As for the former group, we 
consider two indicator variables that equal one if the individual is a smoker/binge drinker and 
two continuous variables measuring the average number of cigarettes/alcoholic beverages  
consumed on a daily basis.34 35 36 37 As for health outcomes, all of the indicators of asthma, 
 
32 As a robustness check, readers might modify our software code to consider only the 1989-2014 sample as in 
the original framework to compare our results against Borjas’ (2015) and Giuntella and Stella’s (2017) results 
on wage and obesity, respectively.. 
33 In this study, we define a native citizen as a US-born person living in the US and an immigrant as a foreign-
born person living in the US. Unfortunately, we are not able to distinguish documented from undocumented 
immigrants. 
34 The original NHIS variable CIGSDAY reports the average number of cigarettes smoked per day for “current 
smokers” (i.e., all “every day” smokers and “some day” smokers who smoked 1+ days or an unknown number 
of days in the past 30 days). Therefore, we identify a “smoker” as one who smokes at least one cigarette per 
day, conditional on having smoked in the past 30 days. 
35 Following the guidelines from the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA), binge 
drinking is defined as “… a pattern of drinking that brings blood alcohol concentration (BAC) levels to 0.08 
g/dL; this typically occurs after 4 drinks for women and 5 drinks for men.” Therefore, a binge drinker is a man 
consuming more than 5 drinks a day, or a woman consuming more than 4 drinks. 
36 Alcoholic beverages include liquor, beer, wine, wine coolers, and any other type of alcoholic beverage. 
37 The NHIS codebook exercises caution in interpreting very high values for drinking habits, as respondents 
who report an average of 20 drinks a day may have misunderstood the question (e.g., they may have given a 
response related to the number of days drank or related to a different reference period, such as the number of 






diabetes, vision problem, and coronary heart disease statuses are codified as one if the 
individual currently has or has ever had the said condition.38 
3.2.2. Empirical specification 
In order to investigate cohort differences in immigrant health upon arrival in the US and in 
the rate of growth of immigrant assimilation, we employ an ordinary least-squares 
specification (also called “linear probability model” whenever the dependent variable is a 
binary indicator) similar to Borjas (2015) and Giuntella and Stella (2017). Such a model 
allows for the presence of cohort differences in the rate of health assimilation. Specifically: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑗𝑐𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗(𝑎𝑖. 𝑐𝑗) + 𝑋𝑖
′Γ + 𝜖𝑖𝑗         (1) 
where the unit of observation is individual i aged 25-64. 𝑦𝑖𝑗 is a measure of the health 
behavior or outcome of interest for person i in cohort j; 𝑎𝑖 is the number of years the 
immigrant has lived in the US (equal to 0 for natives); 𝑐𝑗 indicates one of the cohorts (i.e., 
cohort fixed effects).39 Following the novelty introduced by Giuntella and Stella (2017), we 
include in (1) the factor 𝑎𝑖. 𝑐𝑗, which represents the interaction between the linear term of the 
years-since-migration and each of the cohorts fixed effects. Such a term allows each arrival 
cohort to have its own growth path regarding 𝑦𝑖𝑗 and enables us to examine the differential 
assimilation pattern that the different immigrant arrival cohorts might exhibit. Finally, 𝑋𝑖 is a 
vector of control variables including years of schooling, an indicator for being married, an 
indicator for being employed, and age (introduced as a third-order polynomial) interacted 
 
38 “vision problem” is defined as having trouble seeing, even with glasses or contact lenses. We consider vision 
problems since medical evidence (see, for example, Cheung and Wong, 2007, Zhang et al., 2010) shows that 
unhealthy behavior, excessive weight, and especially diabetes are determinants of many vision problems (e.g., 
macular degeneration, diabetes retinopathy, cataracts, glaucoma). 
39 Two individuals of the same age might migrate to the United States in different years, and vice versa, two 
immigrants spending the same number of years in the US might belong to different age brackets. This allows us 






with a variable indicating whether the person is foreign-born or native.40 The inclusion of 
such controls might better represent the different economic contexts in which immigrants 
live. Years of education, for instance, has a protective effect of reducing the rates of alcohol-
cigarette consumption and incidence of negative health conditions.  
 
As in Giuntella and Stella (2017), we stratify individuals into 8 arrival cohorts (excluding the 
“natives” cohort). While striving to follow their empirical guidelines as closely as possible, 
we opt for heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors instead of clustering by cohorts as they 
did. The main rationale is that with few clusters, the standard errors might be misleadingly 
small. Conceptually, the estimated coefficients of interest should be identical under either 
approach to computing the standard errors. However, given the repeated cross-section nature 
of NHIS data, we believe treating each individual as an independent observation is more 
reasonable. 
 
In equation (1), the 𝛾𝑗 coefficient indicates whether, upon their arrival in the US, immigrants 
are more or less likely to engage in unhealthy behaviors with respect to the otherwise similar 
natives.41 As in Borjas (2015), we also report the relative growth rates of unhealthy 
behaviors/negative healthy conditions in the first 10 years after immigration.42 Such an 
 
40 This is the same set of controls used by Giuntella and Stella (2017) and Borjas (2015). For the “age” variables 
in particular, the focus in not on identifying all coefficients per se. Instead, our introduction of a third-degree 
polynomial in age serves two main purposes: (1) to account for possible non-linearities in the effects of age on 
health; and (2) to reduce the overall bias in the estimation of the main coefficients of interest (please see Holian 
(2021), Orrenius and Zavodny (2010, 2015), for other methodological explanations). 
41 The immigrant's year of arrival is defined as the difference between the survey year and the years since 
migration to the US. However, given that “years since migration” in the NHIS dataset is reported as a 
categorical variable with five intervals (i.e. 0-1, 1-4, 5-9, 10-14 and 15+), we take the midpoint of each interval 
to construct a continuous variable for the year of arrival. The interval 15+ is coded as 29 years. 
42 The 10-year growth in the relative incidence of unhealthy behaviors/negative health outcomes of immigrants 
is calculated by computing immigrant and native incidence rates both at the time of entry, assuming it occurred 






analysis is intended to highlight the trends in the rate of unhealthy assimilation and illustrate 
the extent to which the health gap between natives and immigrants narrows over the first 
decade in the US.43 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Summary statistics 
In Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we report the descriptive statistics on both health behaviors and 
conditions for our final sample separated by gender and stratified by ethnicity and 
citizenship.44 Overall, native men and women acquire about 1.5 more years of schooling than 
do immigrants. This pattern prevails for all ethnic groups with the exception of blacks, 
whereby educational attainment is equalized between natives and immigrants among both 
males and females. Native Americans are also less likely to be married and less likely to be 
employed than are their immigrant counterparts. Most strikingly, natives tend to smoke more 
than immigrants and, on average, experience a higher probability of suffering from ill health. 
This pattern is fairly consistent across different ethnic groups and across different indicators 
of chronic health outcomes. One exception is recorded for diabetes, where for both men and 
women, the incidence of diabetes among natives is generally lower than that among 
immigrants. 
3.3.2. Regression results 
We estimate equation (1) using ordinary least-squares (OLS) (linear probability model for 
binary responses), using the pooled data from the whole sample.45 Tables 3.3 to 3.10 present 
the results for the various health variables considered. The upper panel in each table presents 
 
43 To construct these interactions, we follow Borjas (2015). 
44 In the online appendix, we report mean values for the health outcomes of interest and socio-economic 
variables of immigrants and compare them, using a t-test, with the one from Natives. We find that immigrants 
report different and better health status than the native born, similar to Cunningham et al. (2008) and Giuntella 
et al. (2018). 






coefficient estimates of the immigrant arrival cohort fixed effects, identifying cohorts’ 
differences in health behaviors and statuses between immigrants, at the time of their entry, 
and comparable American natives. The lower part, instead, reports results on the interactions 
between cohort fixed effects and the number of years since migration. Gender-specific and 
subgroup-specific results are also provided.46 
3.3.2.1. Health behaviors: smoking and drinking 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the results for smoking status and smoking frequency, 
respectively. It is important to note that the “growth'” estimate does not represent a marginal 
change. To extract the most information from the tables, we will interpret coefficient 
estimates from the upper and lower panels together. For demonstration, we will take a 
specific example from Table 3.3. All remaining tables can be interpreted in a similar fashion.  
 
First, it can be noticed from the upper panel of Table 3.3 that all cohort coefficients are 
negative, suggesting that immigrants, upon arrival in the US, are less likely to be smokers 
than are their American native counterparts. Take, for instance, an individual who arrives in 
1977 and another individual who arrives in 1997. Relative to natives, the first individual is 
9.67 percentage points less likely to smoke. After ten years, this gap narrows to 9.67-1.55 = 
8.12 percentage points. This convergence suggests a modest assimilation, i.e., this individual 
is getting closer to the natives' smoking behavior. On the other hand, the second individual is 
2.7 percentage points less likely to smoke than a comparable native. After ten years, this gap 
grows to 2.7+4.9 = 7.3 percentage points, indicating divergence. Overall, with the exception 
of the first two cohorts for smoking status, Table 3.3 shows strong evidence of de-
 
46 We tried also to stratify the results by age, dividing the sample in two age brackets (25-40 and 41-65), 






assimilation. This pattern is even clearer for smoking frequency, as can be seen from Table 
3.4. For drinking, there is also de-assimilation. The exception is for binge drinking for the 
1960-1995 cohorts (to be specific, immigrants that belong to any arrival cohort before 1995 
are more likely to engage in binge drinking, relative to natives). 
 
Altogether, the results suggest that broadly speaking, smoking and drinking exhibit signs of 
de-assimilation. The slower assimilation (or rather the de-assimilation) that we find for 
smoking and drinking can be rationalized by the slower economic assimilation that later 
cohorts exhibit (Borjas, 2015), which limits their possibility to purchase higher doses of 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco. Other potential mechanisms are discussed in the section 
that follows. 
3.3.2.2. Health conditions: asthma, diabetes, vision problems and coronary heart diseases 
Tables 3.7 through 3.10 display the trajectories of immigrant health conditions across arrival 
cohorts. Overall, it can be seen that the estimated cohort effects are consistently negative, 
statistically significant, and stable, for all of the health conditions under consideration, except 
for diabetes. To be specific, immigrants are less likely than American natives to suffer from 
asthma, vision problems and coronary heart conditions upon arrival in the US. Over time, 
however, immigrants' health converges toward natives' health standard. 
 
Our analysis of assimilation rates delivers mixed evidence. The relative-growth coefficients 
are consistently positive and statistically significant across health conditions, although no 
clear path is recorded to confirm either convergence or divergence. One interesting pattern, 
however, is noted for asthma, where we find that within the Hispanic group, the assimilation 






recent arrival cohort. Compared to other chronic health conditions, asthma development is 
presumably more strongly influenced by environmental factors and social interactions. 
Referring back to our unconditional-average summary statistics, we note that Hispanic native 
men (women) are almost three (two) times, or 7 percentage points, as likely to suffer from 
asthma as their immigrant counterparts. Given the comparable sample sizes between the two 
groups and the distributions of asthma prevalence, we speculate that the assimilation result 
might be driven by the aforementioned selection mechanism, whereby recent Hispanic 
immigrants are healthier and converge more slowly to the ill-health equilibrium in the host 
country than those from earlier arrival cohorts. This result is also partly attributable to 
possible heterogeneities within the Hispanic group. For example, many studies suggest that 
the Hispanic health paradox is driven by Mexicans (e.g., Giuntella, 2007). Unfortunately, 
IPUMS data do not allow us to go further than the “Hispanic/non-Hispanic” classification. 
We are therefore not able to examine in depth the potential differences in asthma-related 
behaviors among Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans, among other Hispanic subgroups. 
This data limitation leaves a promising venue for future work to address.. 
3.4. Concluding remarks 
This study examined trends in health behaviors (drinking and smoking) and health outcomes 
(asthma, diabetes, vision problems, and coronary heart diseases) among immigrants relative 
to American natives. Using NHIS data (1989-2018), we found not only cohort differences 
but also assimilation heterogeneity for several immigrant health indicators. Overall, our 
results documented some degree of heterogeneity in immigrants' adoption of unhealthy 
behaviors from natives, although this heterogeneity is no longer present as far as longer-term 






(2017), who highlighted a more rapid assimilation in obesity rates that recent arrival cohorts 
exhibit. 
 
Smoking and drinking are two important public health challenges, which have attracted much 
attention from both scholars and policymakers for decades. Grounded within the health 
assimilation framework, we found interesting differences in the dynamics between these 
health behaviors and other health outcomes. These findings provided a more nuanced view of 
how immigrants adapt to the health standards in the host country and, to some extent, were 
suggestive of the socioeconomic forces that different immigrant cohorts experience in the 
backdrop. 
 
To elaborate, immigrants’ health advantage starts in the home countries and deteriorates as 
these individuals stay in the US. However, this is not true for smoking and drinking. For the 
most part, immigrants appear to gain (in terms of reduced smoking and drinking) with time 
spent in the host country. This is somewhat surprising, given the multiple public health 
reports and research studies that document the declining smoking rates and increasing 
alcohol use among Americans (Jamal et al., 2016, OECD, 2015, Safer, 2012). 
 
We propose that this “stickiness” in health behaviors can be rationalized by the pre-existing 
attitudes that are shaped before arrival and engrained in their minds as immigrants acclimate 
themselves to the new environment in the host country. For instance, many might be used to 
the stringent social and cultural rules regarding smoking and drinking that prevail in their 
countries of origin. Further, smoking and drinking are commonly consumed with peers, and 






natives’ habits, despite other influences in the United States. In fact, smoking usually 
involves negative externalities (e.g., secondhand smoke) that make it socially unacceptable in 
many non-US cultures. 
 
The non- (or more precisely, de-) assimilation of drinking and smoking habits might also be 
related to the extent to which public policy and health communication target the overall 
population. As an example, many Hispanic immigrants arrive in the US without a proficient 
command of English and might prefer Spanish-speaking channels to watch at home. This 
possibility is backed by Nielsen's recent report,47 which provides several interesting facts 
about ethnic television (using 2009-2010 data from the American Community Survey). First, 
Spanish-language-dominant homes view 78 percent of TV in Spanish. Second, multi-
language homes view about 50 percent Spanish-language TV. Third, English-language-
dominant homes spend only three percent of time viewing Spanish-language TV. These 
patterns suggest that important health messages regarding smoking and drinking might be 
harder to reach immigrants than natives, or take longer to become effective among certain 
immigrant groups relative to other groups. While we do not have the data to explore this 
channel, we believe it is worth investigating in future work. Altogether, our results reflect 
some interesting aspects of assimilation with the American culture, policy context, and social 
norms that immigrants are exposed to (Ali and Dwyer, 2009, Gaviria and Raphael, 2001, 










To account for assimilation patterns in wages and obesity, previous researchers often rely on 
two widely accepted mechanisms, namely self-selection and socio-cultural protection 
(Antecol and Bedard, 2006, Giuntella, 2017, Kennedy et al., 2015, Riosmena et al., 2013). 
Our study examined long-term trends in health outcomes among different immigrant cohorts 
and documented similar dynamics for asthma, diabetes, coronary heart conditions, and vision 
problems. We speculate that the proposed explanations still matter to a certain degree, 
considering, for instance, the potential role of education and cultural norms in alleviating at 
least some of these health problems. The results might also be explained by selection at 
migration, which varies across cohorts in part because of the host country's differential 
approaches to immigration policy over time. Unfortunately, the lack of information on 
immigrants' country of migration, area of migration, and reference peers prevents us from 
disentangling these channels.48 
 
Other mechanisms could be at work, too. First, the heterogeneity in health outcomes might 
indirectly reflect the long-standing discrimination in the labor market, which varies across 
immigrant cohorts. Despite some initial health advantage, certain groups of immigrants and 
refugees, such as Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians, might face social stigmas from natives even 
prior to their physical entry into the host country and actual participation in the domestic 
labor market (Boswell, 1986, Evans and Kelley, 1991, Wilson and Portes, 1980, Zschirnt and 
Ruedin, 2016).  For instance, entrepreneurship scholars regularly document that many 
immigrants become entrepreneurs as a way to overcome discrimination in the host country 
(Evansluong et al., 2019, Griffin-EL and Olabisi, 2018, Kazlou and Wennberg, 2021, Portes 
 
48 To be clear, NHIS data do contain have a variable for “region of origin,” although information is not available 
for all sampled years and all health conditions. This limited-sample issue renders it challenging to make fair 






and Sensenbrenner, 1993). Other immigrants strive for higher education and high-skilled 
corporate positions to fend off the negative associations with “ethnic enclaves” (Wilson and 
Portes, 1980). Irrespective of their sources, unfounded prejudices might obscure objectivity 
in hiring decisions, prevent immigrants from enjoying similar labor market opportunities to 
those of native citizens, and hence restrain them from investing in education and health at a 
socially efficient level. Should this hypothesis be true, then a more open immigration policy 
that emphasizes an accommodating attitude might be a promising tool for policymakers to 
enable future immigrant cohorts to experience a faster convergence in earnings and a slower 
erosion of the “healthy advantage.” 
 
Aside from the economic-convergence story, it is important to discuss several non-economic 
aspects of immigration and how they might drive the observed health heterogeneity across 
different immigrant cohorts. For most people, relocating permanently to another country is a 
life-changing event, which induces various sources of mental stress. Many immigrants, for 
instance, start from scratch when they arrive in the host country, having to supply labor 
cheaply or illegally to make ends meet (Evansluong and Ramirez-Pasillas, 2019). For this 
group, the constant lack of familial support and the internal urge to take care of family back 
home (e.g., via remittances) may compound their distress levels and negatively their physical 
health (Kazlou and Klinthall, 2019). 
 
Further, first-generation immigrants today might possess a greater skill premium and be 
endowed with more wealth inheritances than in earlier times. Another possibility is that the 
composition of the immigrant cohort entering the host country during an economic boom 






concern that immigrants belonging to different cohorts are not directly comparable. Given 
the lack of information regarding country of origin, it remains a challenge to trace the 
specific sources of the documented heterogeneity in the assimilation dynamics. We 
acknowledge this as an important limitation and leave it for future research. 
 
Given the mixed evidence across racial subgroups, we are cautious about making general 
claims regarding racial heterogeneity. In contrast to gender classifications, where immigrant 
men/women can be compared to native men/women directly, differences along the racial line 
are more difficult to trace, since there is perceivably much more heterogeneity even within 
the same immigrant group. For instance, black immigrants who hail from Africa might be 
substantially different from European and Asian black immigrants on many dimensions, 
making it unlikely that “black immigrants” and “black natives” are valid comparison groups. 
For these reasons, our main message regarding heterogeneity is restricted to two 
considerations: (1) immigrant health varies by arrival cohort; and (2) immigrant health varies 
by outcome/behavior.  
 
As a final word of caution, it can be seen that our results for the last cohort (2014-18) are 
somewhat extreme in terms of both the cohort fixed effect and the relative growth. Since we 
do not have 10 years of data to identify the trend, this anomaly is likely an artefact of 
extrapolation. Readers are therefore encouraged to exercise caution when interpreting results 
from the last cohort. 
 
To sum up, our key takeaways are three-fold: (1) we find systematic differences in all health 






(2) we find consistent evidence of de-assimilation in smoking and drinking among 
immigrants; and (3) for all chronic health conditions, we find that immigrants assimilate with 
the host country's environment. Immigrants arrive in the US with better health outcomes (i.e., 
less likely to have asthma, diabetes, vision problems, and coronary heart diseases) than 
American natives. However, over time, this advantage deteriorates and immigrant health gets 
closer to natives' standards (i.e., worse health). We hope that these results, together with the 
set of results on obesity that Giuntella and Stella (2017) provided, will enrich the immigrant 
health assimilation literature and contribute to what we already know about immigrants’ 
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics for men, by immigrant status and ethnicity 
 All Hispanic White Black 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















0.31 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.32 0.26 0.27 0.17 
Smoker 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.05 
# drinks 
(daily) 
0.89 0.70 0.95 0.85 0.90 0.67 0.75 0.53 
# cigarettes 
(daily) 
1.82 0.70 0.86 0.60 2.00 1.29 1.53 0.53 
Asthma ever 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.04 
Diabetes 
ever 
0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.07 
Vision 
problem 
0.08 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.05 
Coro. heart 
dis. ever 
0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 
Age 43.29 44.66 39.47 43.81 43.79 47.47 43.06 44.97 
Married 0.68 0.77 0.60 0.74 0.72 0.80 0.52 0.69 
Edu (years) 13.29 11.70 12.32 9.52 13.52 14.22 12.48 13.26 
Employed 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.72 0.83 
Before 1970  0.07  0.07  0.15  0.05 
1970-80  0.14  0.14  0.16  0.14 
1980-85  0.15  0.14  0.15  0.17 
1985-90  0.18  0.17  0.18  0.18 
1990-95  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.09 
1995-00  0.12  0.14  0.10  0.11 
2000-05  0.13  0.15  0.08  0.12 
2005-14  0.11  0.09  0.08  0.13 
2014-18  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
<1 year of 
US arrival 
 0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02 
1-5 years  0.16  0.15  0.15  0.15 
5-9 years  0.22  0.23  0.17  0.23 
10-14 years  0.20  0.22  0.15  0.22 
15+ years  0.39  0.38  0.50  0.38 






Table 3.2. Summary statistics for women, by immigrant status and ethnicity 
 All Hispanic White Black 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















0.30 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.31 0.27 0.28 0.17 
Smoker 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.01 
# drinks 
(daily) 
0.61 0.26 0.62 0.26 0.63 0.45 0.52 0.21 
# cigarettes 
(daily) 
1.44 0.30 0.65 0.25 1.61 0.88 1.17 0.11 
Asthma ever 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.07 
Diabetes 
ever 
0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.09 
Vision 
problem 
0.11 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.07 
Coro. heart 
disease ever 
0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Age 43.24 44.95 39.72 44.21 43.81 47.95 42.72 44.96 
Married 0.64 0.71 0.57 0.67 0.70 0.77 0.38 0.56 
Edu (years) 13.28 11.44 12.33 9.63 13.51 13.63 12.72 12.41 
Employed 0.69 0.56 0.67 0.50 0.70 0.59 0.66 0.72 
Before 1970  0.08  0.07  0.19  0.06 
1970-80  0.13  0.14  0.15  0.13 
1980-85  0.14  0.14  0.13  0.15 
1985-90  0.17  0.16  0.17  0.18 
1990-95  0.10  0.11  0.09  0.09 
1995-00  0.12  0.13  0.09  0.10 
2000-05  0.13  0.15  0.08  0.13 
2005-14  0.12  0.09  0.08  0.14 
2014-18  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
<1 year of 
US arrival 
 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
1-5 years  0.16  0.15  0.15  0.16 
5-9 years  0.22  0.23  0.16  0.24 
10-14 years  0.20  0.22  0.14  0.21 
15+ years  0.39  0.38  0.53  0.36 








Table 3.3. OLS estimation results for smoking status 
Dep. Var.:  
Smoker 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cohort effects Full Male Female Hispanic White Black 
Before 1970 -0.0731*** -0.0550* -0.0886*** -0.00990 -0.127*** -0.129*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0237) (0.0175) (0.0244) (0.0264) (0.0268) 
1970-80 -0.0967*** -0.0810*** -0.113*** -0.0337 -0.128*** -0.121*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0222) (0.0161) (0.0233) (0.0239) (0.0182) 
1980-85 -0.0768*** -0.0711*** -0.0850*** -0.0204 -0.0401 -0.0324 
 (0.00962) (0.0145) (0.0125) (0.0157) (0.0287) (0.0291) 
1985-90 -0.0576*** -0.0194 -0.0913*** 0.0102 0.0144 -0.0632*** 
 (0.00632) (0.0108) (0.00692) (0.00898) (0.0199) (0.0173) 
1990-95 -0.00370 0.0480** -0.0425*** 0.0445*** 0.109** -0.0559 
 (0.00995) (0.0175) (0.0107) (0.0126) (0.0342) (0.0300) 
1995-00 -0.0270*** 0.00701 -0.0613*** 0.0136* 0.0548** -0.0495** 
 (0.00524) (0.00873) (0.00589) (0.00693) (0.0175) (0.0158) 
2000-05 -0.0597*** -0.0400*** -0.0804*** -0.00963 0.00902 -0.0472*** 
 (0.00429) (0.00734) (0.00475) (0.00605) (0.0150) (0.0136) 
2005-14 -0.0579*** -0.0356*** -0.0797*** -0.0200*** 0.00745 -0.0527*** 
 (0.00386) (0.00671) (0.00415) (0.00575) (0.0134) (0.0120) 
2014-18 -0.0891*** -0.0922*** -0.0917*** -0.0593** -0.00715 -0.0955*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0233) (0.00900) (0.0185) (0.0451) (0.0190) 
Relative 10-
year growth 
      
1960-1980 0.0155*** 0.0225*** 0.0100*** 0.00595*** 0.0365*** 0.0231*** 
 (0.00646) (0.0107) (0.00739) (0.0104) (0.0164) (0.0146) 
1980-1985 0.00545*** 0.0136*** -0.00106*** -0.00411*** 0.00446*** -0.0106*** 
 (0.00528) (0.00863) (0.00624) (0.00823) (0.0168) (0.0156) 
1985-1990 -0.00130*** -0.00368*** 0.000496*** -0.0171*** -0.0152*** 0.000537*** 
 (0.00475) (0.00812) (0.00524) (0.00716) (0.0152) (0.0138) 
1990-1995 -0.0564*** -0.0680*** -0.0501*** -0.0587*** -0.0923*** 0.00459*** 
 (0.00980) (0.0173) (0.0104) (0.0126) (0.0340) (0.0302) 
1995-2000 -0.0493*** -0.0576*** -0.0388*** -0.0500*** -0.0646*** -0.0109*** 
 (0.00576) (0.00966) (0.00646) (0.00790) (0.0196) (0.0173) 
2000-2014 -0.0229*** -0.0188*** -0.0219*** -0.0312*** -0.0316*** -0.0137*** 
 (0.00467) (0.00808) (0.00511) (0.00692) (0.0160) (0.0141) 
2014-2018 0.107*** 0.209*** 0.0357*** 0.0685*** 0.0108*** 0.180*** 
 (0.0523) (0.103) (0.0408) (0.0830) (0.191) (0.104) 
Observations 994984 472633 522351 152812 651386 136961 
R-squared 0.0448 0.0466 0.0463 0.0194 0.0590 0.0426 
Dem. controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Note: All regressions include a polynomial of degree 3 in recentered age (i.e., actual age - 24) interacted with 
immigrant and native status, years of schooling, marital status and employment status. The heteroskedasticity-









Table 3.4. OLS estimation for smoking intensity 
Dep. Var.: 
Cigarettes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cohort effects Full Male Female Hispanic White Black 
Before 1970 -0.349 -0.294 -0.320 0.479 -1.444* -1.508*** 
 (0.351) (0.420) (0.559) (0.375) (0.620) (0.346) 
1970-80 -0.863* -0.950* -0.767 0.00181 -1.592** -1.343*** 
 (0.338) (0.388) (0.548) (0.356) (0.575) (0.207) 
1980-85 -0.832*** -0.595 -1.110*** -0.0208 0.239 -0.543* 
 (0.196) (0.358) (0.134) (0.175) (0.951) (0.244) 
1985-90 -0.885*** -0.562*** -1.140*** 0.146 0.546 -0.494* 
 (0.0877) (0.152) (0.0936) (0.0995) (0.352) (0.229) 
1990-95 -0.324* 0.130 -0.627*** 0.627*** 1.012 -0.758* 
 (0.127) (0.225) (0.136) (0.149) (0.531) (0.338) 
1995-00 -0.527*** -0.284* -0.797*** 0.232** 0.750** -0.600*** 
 (0.0671) (0.117) (0.0687) (0.0794) (0.252) (0.146) 
2000-05 -0.998*** -1.023*** -1.034*** -0.0545 -0.0532 -0.557*** 
 (0.0529) (0.0912) (0.0579) (0.0648) (0.218) (0.160) 
2005-14 -0.897*** -0.897*** -0.946*** -0.157** -0.0664 -0.584*** 
 (0.0466) (0.0809) (0.0505) (0.0604) (0.186) (0.126) 
2014-18 -1.007*** -1.302*** -0.899*** -0.184 -0.358 -0.916*** 
 (0.149) (0.270) (0.157) (0.306) (0.425) (0.219) 
Relative 10-
year growth 
      
1960-1980 -0.295*** -0.190*** -0.385*** -0.153*** 0.247*** 0.255*** 
 (0.132) (0.167) (0.203) (0.146) (0.290) (0.162) 
1980-1985 -0.366*** -0.422*** -0.289*** -0.229*** -0.451*** -0.0832*** 
 (0.0886) (0.159) (0.0741) (0.0937) (0.412) (0.156) 
1985-1990 -0.340*** -0.426*** -0.270*** -0.308*** -0.580*** -0.0936*** 
 (0.0630) (0.109) (0.0680) (0.0811) (0.238) (0.152) 
1990-1995 -0.989*** -1.182*** -0.859*** -0.846*** -1.065*** 0.154*** 
 (0.125) (0.224) (0.128) (0.146) (0.542) (0.350) 
1995-2000 -0.947*** -1.103*** -0.754*** -0.677*** -1.248*** -0.0752*** 
 (0.0744) (0.131) (0.0745) (0.0920) (0.281) (0.176) 
2000-2014 -0.559*** -0.525*** -0.510*** -0.458*** -0.636*** -0.180*** 
 (0.0583) (0.101) (0.0638) (0.0758) (0.232) (0.162) 
2014-2018 0.404*** 1.327*** 0.0792*** -1.168*** 0.473*** 0.701*** 
 (0.663) (1.149) (0.758) (1.234) (1.803) (0.888) 
Observations 994984 472633 522351 152812 651386 136961 
R-squared 0.0332 0.0362 0.0336 0.0153 0.0479 0.0297 
Dem. controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Note: All regressions include a polynomial of degree 3 in recentered age (i.e., actual age - 24) interacted with 
immigrant and native status, years of schooling, marital status and employment status. The heteroskedasticity-







Table 3.5. OLS estimation for binge-drinking status 
Dep. Var.:  
Binge drinker 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cohort effects Full Male Female Hispanic White Black 
Before1970 1.377*** 1.366*** 1.379*** 1.538*** 1.410*** 1.269*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0266) (0.0260) (0.0279) (0.0407) (0.0625) 
1970-80 0.681*** 0.683*** 0.673*** 0.861*** 0.708*** 0.634*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0258) (0.0254) (0.0272) (0.0401) (0.0593) 
1980-85 0.916*** 0.917*** 0.911*** 1.103*** 0.855*** 0.887*** 
 (0.00920) (0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0141) (0.0235) (0.0313) 
1985-90 0.502*** 0.516*** 0.485*** 0.622*** 0.527*** 0.520*** 
 (0.00648) (0.00953) (0.00884) (0.0100) (0.0166) (0.0228) 
1990-95 0.645*** 0.655*** 0.632*** 0.733*** 0.665*** 0.626*** 
 (0.00593) (0.00897) (0.00789) (0.00949) (0.0152) (0.0228) 
1995-00 -0.226*** -0.202*** -0.252*** -0.0737*** -0.223*** -0.257*** 
 (0.00589) (0.00906) (0.00761) (0.00883) (0.0159) (0.0187) 
2000-05 -0.302*** -0.273*** -0.331*** -0.139*** -0.322*** -0.305*** 
 (0.00435) (0.00719) (0.00514) (0.00741) (0.0109) (0.0146) 
2005-14 -0.293*** -0.273*** -0.312*** -0.139*** -0.306*** -0.306*** 
 (0.00403) (0.00645) (0.00501) (0.00718) (0.0105) (0.0139) 
2014-18 -0.269*** -0.242*** -0.292*** -0.114*** -0.295*** -0.305*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0245) (0.0131) (0.0272) (0.0321) (0.0313) 
1960-1980 -0.399*** -0.395*** -0.400*** -0.434*** -0.382*** -0.320*** 
Relative 10-
year growth 
      
 (0.00790) (0.0116) (0.0108) (0.0125) (0.0186) (0.0264) 
1980-1985 -0.472*** -0.467*** -0.475*** -0.512*** -0.423*** -0.399*** 
 (0.00586) (0.00884) (0.00780) (0.00976) (0.0150) (0.0201) 
1985-1990 -0.343*** -0.344*** -0.341*** -0.365*** -0.317*** -0.287*** 
 (0.00515) (0.00786) (0.00676) (0.00883) (0.0134) (0.0177) 
1990-1995 -0.974*** -0.957*** -0.987*** -0.927*** -0.978*** -0.895*** 
 (0.00648) (0.00999) (0.00848) (0.0104) (0.0176) (0.0233) 
1995-2000 -0.143*** -0.147*** -0.137*** -0.158*** -0.139*** -0.0413*** 
 (0.00649) (0.0101) (0.00829) (0.0101) (0.0174) (0.0206) 
2000-2014 -0.0558*** -0.0627*** -0.0479*** -0.0834*** -0.0299*** 0.00880*** 
 (0.00482) (0.00791) (0.00581) (0.00856) (0.0120) (0.0161) 
2014-2018 -0.0884*** -0.150*** -0.0443*** -0.186*** -0.115*** 0.0594*** 
 (0.0550) (0.102) (0.0535) (0.114) (0.124) (0.140) 
Observations 1356172 643382 712790 184573 919516 183684 
R-squared 0.0814 0.0756 0.0874 0.237 0.0456 0.0645 
Dem. controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Note: All regressions include a polynomial of degree 3 in recentered age (i.e., actual age - 24) interacted with 
immigrant and native status, years of schooling, marital status and employment status. The heteroskedasticity-






Table 3.6. OLS estimation for drinking intensity 
Dep. Var.  
# drinks 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cohort 
effects 
Full Male Female Hispanic White Black 
Before1970 -0.595*** -0.643*** -0.561*** -0.275 -0.757*** -0.573*** 
 (0.0780) (0.139) (0.0716) (0.159) (0.120) (0.173) 
1970-80 -0.626*** -0.710*** -0.576*** -0.377** -0.634*** -0.544*** 
 (0.0689) (0.130) (0.0502) (0.143) (0.113) (0.160) 
1980-85 -0.433*** -0.460*** -0.453*** -0.218* -0.327** -0.449** 
 (0.0553) (0.0956) (0.0556) (0.104) (0.124) (0.152) 
1985-90 -0.121* 0.159 -0.394*** 0.179 -0.140 -0.236* 
 (0.0545) (0.106) (0.0351) (0.0915) (0.0917) (0.116) 
1990-95 -0.127* 0.112 -0.331*** 0.159 -0.184 -0.313* 
 (0.0599) (0.117) (0.0464) (0.0985) (0.100) (0.135) 
1995-00 -0.182*** -0.0447 -0.374*** 0.0178 -0.0266 -0.352*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0681) (0.0464) (0.0672) (0.0899) (0.0919) 
2000-05 -0.265*** -0.0978 -0.483*** -0.0568 -0.123 -0.444*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0653) (0.0222) (0.0525) (0.109) (0.117) 
2005-14 -0.284*** -0.151** -0.468*** -0.0425 -0.151* -0.335*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0554) (0.0211) (0.0521) (0.0701) (0.0690) 
2014-18 -0.236* -0.129 -0.448*** 0.00120 0.0684 -0.511*** 
 (0.0961) (0.189) (0.0666) (0.198) (0.226) (0.130) 
Relative 10-
year growth 
      
1960-1980 0.174*** 0.245*** 0.142*** 0.0544*** 0.124*** 0.195*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0742) (0.0285) (0.0738) (0.0777) (0.108) 
1980-1985 0.103*** 0.154*** 0.0943*** 0.00110*** 0.0220*** 0.171*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0653) (0.0287) (0.0634) (0.0784) (0.103) 
1985-1990 -0.00645*** -0.0653*** 0.0740*** -0.150*** -0.0436*** 0.0915*** 
 (0.0325) (0.0615) (0.0249) (0.0580) (0.0732) (0.0996) 
1990-1995 -0.122*** -0.185*** -0.0492*** -0.301*** -0.0570*** 0.0601*** 
 (0.0596) (0.116) (0.0465) (0.0992) (0.104) (0.135) 
1995-2000 -0.0997*** -0.116*** -0.0269*** -0.217*** -0.303*** 0.218*** 
 (0.0439) (0.0759) (0.0459) (0.0734) (0.0941) (0.103) 
2000-2014 -0.0104*** -0.0486*** 0.100*** -0.112*** -0.129*** 0.214*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0728) (0.0249) (0.0610) (0.111) (0.131) 
2014-2018 -0.236*** -0.431*** 0.206*** -0.173*** -1.737*** 0.721*** 
 (0.412) (0.808) (0.294) (0.876) (0.911) (0.573) 
Observations 995785 472779 523006 153153 651521 137047 
R-squared 0.0302 0.0316 0.0377 0.0166 0.0407 0.0195 
Dem. 
controls 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Note: All regressions include a polynomial of degree 3 in recentered age (i.e., actual age - 24) interacted with 
immigrant and native status, years of schooling, marital status and employment status. The heteroskedasticity-






Table 3.7. OLS estimation for asthma status 
Dep. Var.:  
Asthma ever 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cohort 
effects 
Full Male Female Hispanic White Black 
1980-85 -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.143*** -0.141*** -0.186*** -0.0923 
 (0.0231) (0.0265) (0.0369) (0.0330) (0.0565) (0.0798) 
1985-90 -0.129*** -0.112*** -0.146*** -0.109*** -0.122*** -0.0958** 
 (0.00964) (0.0130) (0.0141) (0.0143) (0.0301) (0.0332) 
1990-95 -0.129*** -0.120*** -0.135*** -0.112*** -0.142*** -0.137*** 
 (0.00973) (0.0131) (0.0141) (0.0145) (0.0246) (0.0354) 
1995-00 -0.122*** -0.111*** -0.129*** -0.104*** -0.116*** -0.0981*** 
 (0.00666) (0.00891) (0.00980) (0.0111) (0.0189) (0.0235) 
2000-05 -0.118*** -0.111*** -0.121*** -0.0945*** -0.136*** -0.0985*** 
 (0.00632) (0.00869) (0.00911) (0.0106) (0.0188) (0.0254) 
2005-14 -0.109*** -0.106*** -0.109*** -0.0828*** -0.116*** -0.0842*** 
 (0.00565) (0.00773) (0.00817) (0.0104) (0.0160) (0.0235) 
2014-18 -0.105*** -0.0897* -0.108** -0.0823 -0.0642 -0.180*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0405) (0.0400) (0.0518) (0.0803) (0.0266) 
Relative 10-
year growth 
      
1960-1980 -0.00253*** 0.00632*** -0.00974*** -0.0145*** 0.0140*** -0.0194*** 
 (0.00478) (0.00695) (0.00695) (0.00867) (0.0134) (0.0173) 
1980-1985 0.0486*** 0.0558*** 0.0418*** 0.0343*** 0.0902*** 0.0205*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0128) (0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0264) (0.0375) 
1985-1990 0.0469*** 0.0481*** 0.0460*** 0.0248*** 0.0707*** 0.0214*** 
 (0.00746) (0.0100) (0.0109) (0.0128) (0.0211) (0.0267) 
1990-1995 0.0504*** 0.0556*** 0.0424*** 0.0295*** 0.0692*** 0.0720*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0143) (0.0158) (0.0162) (0.0280) (0.0410) 
1995-2000 0.0432*** 0.0451*** 0.0394*** 0.0239*** 0.0602*** 0.0146*** 
 (0.00829) (0.0110) (0.0122) (0.0137) (0.0245) (0.0272) 
2000-2014 0.0393*** 0.0488*** 0.0278*** 0.00642*** 0.0962*** 0.0330*** 
 (0.00722) (0.00997) (0.0103) (0.0123) (0.0223) (0.0282) 
2014-2018 0.144*** 0.136*** 0.115*** 0.212*** -0.0437*** 0.427*** 
 (0.125) (0.178) (0.176) (0.234) (0.344) (0.165) 
Observations 435817 196399 239418 60112 289276 65368 
R-squared 0.0116 0.00936 0.0131 0.0269 0.00715 0.0116 
Dem. 
controls  
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Note: All regressions include a polynomial of degree 3 in recentered age (i.e., actual age - 24) interacted with 
immigrant and native status, years of schooling, marital status and employment status. The heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. We drop rows where coefficients are missing as a result of 
perfect multicollinearity. We retain the current presentation of the results to be consistent with other tables. *** 






Table 3.8. OLS estimation for diabetes status 
Dep. Var.: 
Diab ever 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cohort 
effects 
Full Male Female Hispanic White Black 
Before1970 -0.120*** -0.144*** -0.100*** -0.118*** -0.0782*** -0.143*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0166) (0.0172) (0.0195) (0.0187) (0.0431) 
1970-80 -0.0599*** -0.0743*** -0.0485*** -0.0701*** -0.0373* -0.0899** 
 (0.00929) (0.0118) (0.0142) (0.0155) (0.0151) (0.0284) 
1980-85 -0.0390*** -0.0353*** -0.0426*** -0.0535*** -0.00842 -0.0291 
 (0.00596) (0.00791) (0.00893) (0.00989) (0.0148) (0.0192) 
1985-90 -0.0333*** -0.0313*** -0.0342*** -0.0442*** -0.0230** -0.00922 
 (0.00491) (0.00665) (0.00715) (0.00893) (0.00832) (0.0202) 
1990-95 -0.0372*** -0.0446*** -0.0289** -0.0387*** -0.0311** -0.0348 
 (0.00665) (0.00873) (0.00974) (0.0106) (0.0114) (0.0290) 
1995-00 -0.0244*** -0.0232*** -0.0232*** -0.0337*** -0.00895 -0.0217 
 (0.00410) (0.00551) (0.00605) (0.00668) (0.00852) (0.0153) 
2000-05 -0.0206*** -0.0170** -0.0218*** -0.0296*** -0.00322 -0.00308 
 (0.00406) (0.00585) (0.00565) (0.00672) (0.00863) (0.0157) 
2005-14 -0.0111** -0.00559 -0.0148** -0.0207** 0.00473 -0.0223 
 (0.00348) (0.00489) (0.00496) (0.00631) (0.00863) (0.0136) 
2014-18 -0.0169 -0.0152 -0.0152 0.0143 0.0177 -0.0790*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0251) (0.0172) (0.0354) (0.0444) (0.0236) 
Relative 10-
year growth 
      
1960-1980 0.0154*** 0.0290*** 0.00387*** 0.00614*** 0.00512*** 0.0343*** 
 (0.00611) (0.00852) (0.00875) (0.0104) (0.0117) (0.0228) 
1980-1985 0.0178*** 0.0186*** 0.0165*** 0.0153*** 0.00245*** 0.00466*** 
 (0.00539) (0.00754) (0.00768) (0.00922) (0.0115) (0.0202) 
1985-1990 0.00985*** 0.0140*** 0.00560*** 0.00326*** 0.00350*** 0.00200*** 
 (0.00509) (0.00721) (0.00716) (0.00911) (0.00982) (0.0196) 
1990-1995 0.0176*** 0.0360*** 0.000866*** 0.00249*** 0.0280*** 0.0177*** 
 (0.00818) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0127) (0.0161) (0.0351) 
1995-2000 0.0105*** 0.0184*** 0.00295*** 0.00661*** -0.00224*** 0.0128*** 
 (0.00594) (0.00844) (0.00836) (0.00952) (0.0124) (0.0210) 
2000-2014 0.00994*** 0.0163*** 0.00498*** 0.00446*** 0.000234*** 0.00279*** 
 (0.00525) (0.00760) (0.00726) (0.00892) (0.0119) (0.0188) 
2014-2018 0.0504*** 0.0673*** 0.0323*** -0.146*** -0.1000*** 0.196*** 
 (0.0678) (0.108) (0.0799) (0.149) (0.185) (0.117) 
Observations 518821 234511 284310 64992 353591 76485 
R-squared 0.0520 0.0587 0.0491 0.0914 0.0393 0.0724 
Dem. 
controls  
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Note: All regressions include a polynomial of degree 3 in recentered age (i.e., actual age - 24) interacted with 
immigrant and native status, years of schooling, marital status and employment status. The heteroskedasticity-






Table 3.9. OLS estimation for vision problems 
Dep. Var.:  
Vision prob 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cohort 
effects 
Full Male Female Hispanic White Black 
Before1970 -0.0856*** -0.0370 -0.127*** -0.0782* -0.0588 -0.191*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0262) (0.0271) (0.0307) (0.0408) (0.0369) 
1970-80 -0.0664*** -0.0345 -0.0955*** -0.0675* -0.0220 -0.153*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0237) (0.0249) (0.0283) (0.0384) (0.0267) 
1980-85 -0.0478*** -0.0227 -0.0687*** -0.0533** 0.00677 -0.0630 
 (0.0118) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0193) (0.0331) (0.0350) 
1985-90 -0.0680*** -0.0470*** -0.0834*** -0.0750*** -0.0233 -0.0734** 
 (0.00797) (0.0106) (0.0116) (0.0131) (0.0198) (0.0271) 
1990-95 -0.0648*** -0.0462** -0.0752*** -0.0646*** -0.0355 -0.114** 
 (0.0108) (0.0154) (0.0150) (0.0158) (0.0198) (0.0415) 
1995-00 -0.0579*** -0.0403*** -0.0697*** -0.0656*** -0.0177 -0.0866*** 
 (0.00602) (0.00822) (0.00873) (0.00985) (0.0162) (0.0174) 
2000-05 -0.0605*** -0.0451*** -0.0700*** -0.0628*** -0.0334* -0.0452* 
 (0.00552) (0.00751) (0.00799) (0.00932) (0.0139) (0.0223) 
2005-14 -0.0453*** -0.0302*** -0.0548*** -0.0403*** -0.0316* -0.0673*** 
 (0.00480) (0.00648) (0.00700) (0.00904) (0.0125) (0.0178) 
2014-18 -0.0661** -0.0684** -0.0563 -0.105*** -0.0362 -0.0248 
 (0.0224) (0.0262) (0.0361) (0.0288) (0.0447) (0.119) 
Relative 10-
year growth 
      
1960-1980 0.0216*** 0.00993*** 0.0318*** 0.0222*** 0.00618*** 0.0757*** 
 (0.00862) (0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0146) (0.0200) (0.0231) 
1980-1985 0.0149*** 0.00528*** 0.0225*** 0.0196*** -0.00583*** 0.0433*** 
 (0.00722) (0.00996) (0.0104) (0.0125) (0.0187) (0.0239) 
1985-1990 0.0279*** 0.0204*** 0.0335*** 0.0332*** 0.0114*** 0.0527*** 
 (0.00661) (0.00898) (0.00956) (0.0117) (0.0159) (0.0225) 
1990-1995 0.0198*** 0.0235*** 0.0136*** 0.0173*** -0.00226*** 0.0988*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0169) (0.0165) (0.0174) (0.0225) (0.0462) 
1995-2000 0.0218*** 0.0260*** 0.0172*** 0.0332*** 0.00166*** 0.0688*** 
 (0.00769) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0126) (0.0211) (0.0218) 
2000-2014 0.0253*** 0.0216*** 0.0272*** 0.0304*** 0.0154*** 0.0319*** 
 (0.00648) (0.00877) (0.00937) (0.0113) (0.0168) (0.0244) 
2014-2018 0.187*** 0.220*** 0.143*** 0.371*** 0.0467*** -0.0715*** 
 (0.0999) (0.117) (0.160) (0.147) (0.195) (0.496) 
Observations 463937 208684 255253 61841 311077 69243 
R-squared 0.0327 0.0358 0.0303 0.0392 0.0277 0.0458 
Dem. 
controls  
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Note: All regressions include a polynomial of degree 3 in recentered age (i.e., actual age - 24) interacted with 
immigrant and native status, years of schooling, marital status and employment status. The heteroskedasticity-






Table 3.10. OLS estimation for coronary heart diseases 
Dep. Var.: 
Coro. heart 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cohort 
effects 
Full Male Female Hispanic White Black 
1985-90 -0.0138* -0.0114 -0.0128 -0.00920 0.00162 -0.00424 
 (0.00545) (0.00883) (0.00676) (0.00742) (0.0170) (0.0193) 
1990-95 -0.0167*** -0.0191** -0.0116 -0.00540 -0.0173 -0.0135 
 (0.00462) (0.00665) (0.00633) (0.00594) (0.0168) (0.0160) 
1995-00 -0.00710* -0.0124*** -0.000756 -0.000493 0.00103 -0.0179** 
 (0.00286) (0.00367) (0.00437) (0.00451) (0.00758) (0.00628) 
2000-05 -0.00906*** -0.0117** -0.00594 -0.00160 -0.00891 -0.00815 
 (0.00253) (0.00358) (0.00359) (0.00399) (0.00597) (0.00950) 
2005-14 -0.00623** -0.00750* -0.00458 -0.000205 -0.00832 -0.00992 
 (0.00218) (0.00317) (0.00303) (0.00381) (0.00532) (0.00697) 
2014-18 -0.0220*** -0.0316*** -0.0143*** -0.0160** -0.0224*** -0.0331** 
 (0.00282) (0.00471) (0.00378) (0.00487) (0.00645) (0.0103) 
Relative 10-
year growth 
      
1960-1980 0.00225*** 0.00608*** 0.00175*** 0.000558*** 0.000139*** 0.00386*** 
 (0.00279) (0.00439) (0.00318) (0.00439) (0.00688) (0.00750) 
1980-1985 0.00523*** 0.00856*** 0.00241*** 0.00288*** 0.00652*** 0.00928*** 
 (0.00244) (0.00370) (0.00324) (0.00394) (0.00642) (0.00831) 
1985-1990 0.0102*** 0.0142*** 0.00583*** 0.00589*** 0.00407*** 0.0112*** 
 (0.00397) (0.00617) (0.00516) (0.00611) (0.0107) (0.0135) 
1990-1995 0.0104*** 0.0160*** 0.00467*** -0.00173*** 0.0207*** 0.0115*** 
 (0.00530) (0.00784) (0.00714) (0.00660) (0.0205) (0.0186) 
1995-2000 0.00548*** 0.0152*** -0.00296*** -0.000431*** 0.00203*** 0.0222*** 
 (0.00373) (0.00523) (0.00535) (0.00570) (0.0111) (0.00989) 
2000-2014 0.00577*** 0.00953*** 0.00382*** 0.000223*** 0.0101*** 0.00978*** 
 (0.00309) (0.00446) (0.00430) (0.00502) (0.00815) (0.0113) 
2014-2018 0.0638*** 0.1000*** 0.0436*** 0.0581*** 0.0889*** 0.0857*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0246) (0.0251) (0.0382) (0.0544) (0.0359) 
Observations 421921 190270 231651 59327 278579 63520 
R-squared 0.0360 0.0526 0.0263 0.0328 0.0362 0.0404 
Dem. 
controls  
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Note: All regressions include a polynomial of degree 3 in recentered age (i.e., actual age - 24) interacted with 
immigrant and native status, years of schooling, marital status and employment status. The heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. We drop rows where coefficients are missing as a result of 
perfect multicollinearity. We retain the current presentation of the results to be consistent with other tables. *** 
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